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Complaints regarding the appropriate scope of government 
action come from both directions. Many complain about the ev-
er-increasing scope of governmental action; other complaints 
attack the opposite phenomenon: the privatization of formerly 
government-run activities and operations. Private, profit-
making corporations now own and run schools,1 prisons,2 air-
ports,3 toll roads,4 and even parking meters.5 Advocates con-
tend that the privatization of government functions increases 
the efficiency of providing, and thereby decreases the cost of de-
 
 1. See Vaughan Byrnes, Getting a Feel for the Market: The Use of Priva-
tized School Management in Philadelphia, 115 AM. J. EDUC. 437, 439 (2009), 
available at http://journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdf/10.1086/597486 (describing the 
decision to hire Edison Schools to run some of Philadelphia’s public schools).  
 2. See William Sabol et al., Prisoners in 2008, BUREAU JUST. STAT. 
BULL., Dec. 2009, at 32, 38 app. tbl.18, available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/p08.pdf (claiming eight percent of state and federal prisoners 
held in private correctional facilities in 2008). 
 3. The privatization of airports “has been a significant worldwide trend” 
since the 1980s. Richard de Neufville, Airport Privatization: Issues for the 
United States, 1662 TRANSP. RES. REC. 24, 24 (1999), available at http://trb 
.metapress.com/content/f27u52582j22787v/. In the United States, though ma-
jor commercial airports are technically owned by governmental entities, many 
have always been “run through a form of partnership between the federal gov-
ernment, local civic interests, and private companies.” Id. at 27. In 1996, Con-
gress authorized a pilot program under which the FAA may permit up to five 
airports to be fully privatized. The agency has accepted preliminary privatiza-
tion applications for four airports, though none has yet finalized an agreement 
with a private contractor. See FAA Accepts Preliminary Privatization Applica-
tion for Georgia GA Airport, AVIATION NEWS TODAY (May 27, 2010), http:// 
www.aviationnews.net/?do=headline&news_ID=179741. 
 4. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-44, HIGHWAY 
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: MORE RIGOROUS UP-FRONT ANALYSIS COULD 
BETTER SECURE POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND PROTECT THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
15–16 (2008) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/new 
.items/d0844.pdf (listing current and contemplated U.S. public-private high-
way projects); Celeste Pagano, Proceed with Caution: Avoiding Hazards in Toll 
Road Privatizations, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 351, 355–56 (2009) (“So far, twen-
ty-three states and Puerto Rico have passed laws to allow for road privatiza-
tion.”). Such partnerships exist in many other nations as well. See GAO 
REPORT supra, at 18 fig.4. These arrangements cover the full gamut of high-
way infrastructure, from roads to bridges and tunnels.  
 5. See CITY COUNCIL, CITY OF CHI., JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, SPECIAL MEETING 
(2008) [hereinafter CHICAGO PARKING METER CONCESSION], available at 
http://www.chicityclerk.com/journals/2008/dec4_2008/120408_SP.pdf#search= 
“parking meter lease 2008” (enacting an ordinance that authorizes a contract for 
sale/lease of Chicago parking meters and reprinting the lease agreement). Other 
cities are considering similar proposals. See Mick Dumke, Spreading the Privati-
zation Gospel, CHI. READER BLOG (Feb. 9, 2010), http://www.chicagoreader.com/ 
TheBlog/archives/2010/02/09/spreading-the-privatization-gospel (discussing cit-
ies such as Pittsburgh, Los Angeles, and Las Vegas).  
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livering public goods and services. They argue that between the 
incentive provided by the profit motive and the absence of legal 
and political restrictions typically imposed on public enterpris-
es, private entrepreneurs will innovate their way to stream-
lined operations and more effective management techniques.6 
Which, if any, of the many privatization arrangements have ac-
tually resulted in this desirable state of affairs is a subject of 
debate.7 What is not debatable, although, is that many recent 
privatization deals have been motivated less by the possibility 
of achieving efficiency advantages than by politicians’ desire to 
 
 6. See, e.g., JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION: PUBLIC 
ENDS, PRIVATE MEANS 217 (1991) (“When it works well, privatization can 
boost efficiency through accelerated innovation, more appropriate technologies 
or management styles, or a more sensible scale of operation.”); Ellen Dannin, 
Red Tape or Accountability: Privatization, Public-ization, and Public Values, 
15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111, 113 (2005) (“[T]hose who advocated priva-
tization argued that markets and competition could always be relied upon to 
provide the highest quality services at the lowest cost.”); Michael Schill, Priva-
tizing Federal Low Income Housing Assistance: The Case of Public Housing, 75 
CORNELL L. REV. 878, 902 (1990) (“Several studies have noted that the ab-
sence of market discipline may contribute to the increased cost of public hous-
ing.”); Dru Stevenson, Privatization of Welfare Services: Delegation by Com-
mercial Contract, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 83, 83–84 (2003) (“Advocates of 
privatization argue that market forces automatically bring more efficiency to 
any government undertaking . . . .”). 
 7. This is not a debate I am prepared to enter, though it is worth noting 
that the evidence of effectiveness is mixed. Compare DENNIS C. MUELLER, 
PUBLIC CHOICE II 262–66 (1989) (finding that in only two of more than fifty 
comparisons of similar service provisions by public and private firms were 
public firms found to be more efficient), with Dannin, supra note 6, at 113–14 
(“Federal employees won 90% of all competitions conducted under the regula-
tions in Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 in FY-2004 and FY-
2003.”), id. at 120 (“To be credible, privatization proponents need to account 
for phenomena, such as persistent evidence that government services are su-
perior to those of private contractors on both cost and quality.”), Stevenson, 
supra note 6, at 87 (describing how President Johnson’s 1966 downsizing of 
the executive branch caused “numerous consulting firms [to spring] up, 
manned by the former federal employees, which in turn received lucrative con-
tracts[, the costs of which] exceeded the personnel costs they replaced”), and 
id. at 89–90 (providing examples of disastrous privatization projects). Also 
worth noting is that before privatization can benefit citizens in their role as 
customers, the operational gains generated by privatized operations must 
throw off enough additional cash to cover both a return to the private inves-
tors and the income tax due on its profits. Otherwise, privatization merely af-
fects a wealth transfer from public employees to private investors, a slightly 
less attractive shift than the one recognized as “debatable” by one of privatiza-
tion’s leading proponents. See John D. Donahue, Privatization and Public Em-
ployment: An Essay on the Current Status and the Stakes, 28 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 1693, 1712 (2001) (calling for “informed public deliberation” over the “vir-
tues and drawbacks . . . of shift[ing] resources from citizens-as-producers to 
citizens-as-consumers”). 
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surreptitiously borrow money. The upfront payments received 
by jurisdictions entering into privatization agreements, such as 
the City of Chicago’s recent “lease” of its parking meters,8 are, 
at best, the present value9 of what would have been future tax 
(fee) revenue. Rather than true privatization transactions,10 it 
is more accurate to describe these deals as loans repayable out 
of future governmental revenues. If unchecked, they are likely 
to expand in quantity and context. Today, parking meters are 
the subject of these deals; tomorrow, jurisdictions may enter in-
to similar deals involving car registration fees, hunting li-
censes, and other user fees. In the not-so-eventual future, ju-
risdictions may even “sell” the rights to collect property and 
income taxes to investors alleging better collection techniques 
and expressing a willingness to accept the risk that future rev-
enues will fall.11  
There is nothing inherently wrong with governmental debt. 
Indeed, there are many situations in which governments 
 
 8. See generally CHICAGO PARKING METER CONCESSION, supra note 5 
(reprinting the lease contract). Although denominated the “lease” and a “con-
cession,” section 2.6 of the Concession provides:  
[The] Agreement is intended for United States federal and state in-
come Tax purposes to be a sale of the Metered Parking System and 
the Metered Parking System Assets to the Concessionaire and the 
grant to the Concessionaire of a right for and during the Term to col-
lect and retain Metered Parking Revenues. 
Id. at 50,563. 
 9. Present value is the value on a given date of a future sum of money or 
stream of cash flows, discounted to reflect the time value of money. See David 
R. Henderson, Present Value, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS 
408, 408 (2008), available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PresentValue 
.html. A present value calculation is essentially the reverse of a compound in-
terest computation. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 
30–31 (14th ed. 2006). Choosing the discount or interest rate usually is the 
most fraught and contested part of a present value calculation. 
 10. For purposes of this Article, a “true privatization transaction” is a 
transaction primarily intended to achieve managerial and efficiency gains. 
Again, as discussed supra note 7, I have no position on whether “true privatiza-
tion transactions” do generate such gains, even when they are intended to do so. 
 11. This would resemble the medieval practice of “tax farming” in which 
governments auctioned off the right to collect a group’s tax obligations. See 
Myriam E. Gilles, Representational Standing: U.S. ex rel. Stevens and the Fu-
ture of Public Law Litigation, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 315, 356 n.222 (2001) (tracing 
tax farming to the Roman era); Timur Kuran, The Absence of the Corporation 
in Islamic Law: Origins and Persistence, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 785, 824 (2005) 
(describing this practice as “known in antiquity and, under Islam, used from 
an early period . . . to maximize the ruler’s tax revenue, which he received 
partly in advance, in the form of a down payment”). 
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should use debt to finance their spending priorities.12 Yet, not 
all forms of debt are created equal, and, as this Article argues, 
debt masquerading as privatization is a particularly noxious 
form. Debt masquerading as privatization costs governments 
more than conventional debt on two main fronts. First, gov-
ernments are unlikely to borrow at rates as favorable as the 
rates they would obtain when issuing conventional debt.13 
Second, privatization debt limits government flexibility more 
significantly than other forms of debt. Further, privatization 
debt is less transparent to voters, and perhaps even politicians. 
While one might have hoped that these disadvantages would 
discourage jurisdictions from engaging in debt-masquerading-
as-privatization transactions, these transactions seem to be be-
coming more, rather than less, popular. This Article proposes a 
set of legal changes that would help steer governments away 
from privatization debt and toward more conventional debt 
transactions.  
Part I of this Article examines the use and abuse of debt in 
government finance and outlines the legal constraints that 
have been imposed on government debt in reaction to the 
abuses. Part II looks at the techniques developed to avoid those 
constraints, including the development of camouflaged transac-
tions. Part III details the peculiar harms of privatization debt 
and compares them to the harms generated by prior avoidance 
techniques. Finally, Part IV proposes legal rules that, if 
adopted, would discourage debt-masquerading-as-privatization 
transactions. 
I.  THE ROLE OF DEBT IN STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT FINANCE   
The phenomenon of government, or sovereign, debt is as 
old as government.14 It has always been a mixed blessing. Gov-
ernment debt is a mechanism for funding government projects 
that deliver long-term benefits and for mitigating the effects of 
short-term cyclical budget fluctuations, but it also allows politi-
 
 12. For examples of beneficial uses of debt, see infra Part I.A. 
 13. See GEORGE K. YARROW & PIOTR JASIŃSKI, PRIVATIZATION: CRITICAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE WORLD ECONOMY 193 (2004) (noting that governments 
that sell off nationalized industries generally find less favorable returns). 
 14. See JAMES MACDONALD, A FREE NATION DEEP IN DEBT: THE 
FINANCIAL ROOTS OF DEMOCRACY 36 (2003) (“From the end of the fifth century 
until the middle of the first century B.C., more than one hundred records of 
civic borrowing exist.”). 
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cians and their constituents to postpone making hard decisions, 
leading to default and future economic crises. The history of 
debt issued by U.S. states and municipalities follows this gen-
eral pattern of use and abuse. The abuses have led to the adop-
tion of specific limitations on the powers of most states and lo-
calities to issue debt. 
A. THE CASE FOR DEBT 
Government debt transfers the cost of providing current 
governmental services to future years.15 As with private debt, 
the hope is that money will become available in the future to 
repay the borrowed money because future taxpayers will be ei-
ther better able or more willing than current taxpayers to pay 
the cost of these services through the necessary taxes or fees. In 
many cases, allocating government costs to a later set of rate-
payers can be seen as appropriate or even “fair.” There is no 
particular reason why construction-era ratepayers or taxpay-
ers16 should bear the full cost of a bridge, school, or some other 
long-lived asset.17 Given ratepayers’ geographic mobility and 
demographic characteristics, it seems reasonable to force later 
generations of ratepayers to absorb the costs of benefits that 
they enjoy. Such a division of costs is easily obtained when 
projects are financed through debt. This debt can be repaid 
through taxes or fees levied on the beneficiaries of the project 
as they take advantage of it.18 Indeed, if governments cannot 
 
 15. See William G. Bowen et al., The Public Debt: A Burden on Future 
Generations?, 50 AM. ECON. REV. 701, 702 (1960) (arguing that the public debt 
“shifts the burden” to future generations). 
 16. Governments may extract money through the imposition of taxes or 
fees and the payers may be variously denominated as feepayers, ratepayers, or 
taxpayers. Since nothing in this Article turns on the distinction between these 
various groups, the terms are used interchangeably to refer to persons or enti-
ties subject to governmental exactions. 
 17. See, e.g., RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 792 (7th ed. 2009) 
(“[B]orrowing is a means of achieving intergenerational equity.”); E. Donald 
Elliott, Constitutional Conventions and the Deficit, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1077, 
1092–93 (“[W]hen the government borrows money to build a highway, future 
generations receive a capital asset that offsets the liability incurred to build 
the highway.”).  
 18. Fees, rather than taxes, may be used to generate the funds necessary 
to pay off the debt if access to the debt-financed project or service can be re-
stricted and there is no philosophical or political objection to excluding those 
unwilling or incapable of paying the fee. While relatively few would cavil at 
the prospect of imposing user fees on tickets to sports events to cover the cost 
of the sporting arena, for example, taxes are used to defray the costs of debt-
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use debt as a financing mechanism, they may not undertake 
many worthy but long-lived projects.19  
Further, debt financing can be used to smooth the periodic 
fluctuations in government receipts caused by the normal busi-
ness cycle. As is often noted, the need for government services 
generally increases in times of fiscal stress while tax revenues 
fall.20 Judicious levels of debt allow government actors to play a 
countercyclical financial role, thereby compensating for, rather 
than accentuating, the business cycle.21 Governments can bor-
row in bad times and repay those debts in better times, leaving 
fiscal room to borrow during the next downturn.22 
 
financed school projects. See, e.g., BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 17, at 
727 (“If there is a broad social interest in universal availability of a particular 
service, the fee might have to be set below the cost of providing the service—or 
dropped altogether—to avoid excluding people who cannot otherwise afford to 
pay.”); Clayton P. Gillette & Thomas D. Hopkins, Federal User Fees: A Legal 
and Economic Analysis, 67 B.U. L. REV. 795, 817 (1987) (describing the special 
case of “merit goods”); Laurie Reynolds, Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and 
the “Get What You Pay For” Model of Local Government, 56 FLA. L. REV. 373, 
388 (2004) (“In general, though, commonly accepted values about the govern-
ment’s obligation to provide essential services and deeply held convictions 
about the public benefit of those services will operate to restrain the zeal with 
which local government seeks to recoup the cost of some services from the us-
er.”); id. at 387 n.63 (citing cases holding that public education must be “free,” 
which is to say financed by tax revenues).  
 19. See ROBERT S. AMDURSKY & CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, MUNICIPAL DEBT 
FINANCE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 11 (1992) (“In addition, the increased 
burden on the first generation of users will induce them to undersupply these 
[long-lived] resources.”). 
 20. See David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
2544, 2609 (2005) (“Declining economic activity unbalances state and local 
budgets: revenues shrink while demand rises for some public services, such as 
welfare and Medicaid.”).  
 21. The federal government is in a better position to engage in Keynesian 
policies than are state governments because the federal government has more 
levers of fiscal control. While the federal government has “automatic stabiliz-
ers” that “cushion” the economy, see id. at 2608 (discussing the role of entitle-
ment programs), state governments often must follow anti-Keynesian policies 
because they are subject to balanced-budget requirements, see id. at 2609 
(“[S]tates’ fiscal constitutions not only prevent them from assisting in the ex-
ecution of countercyclical economic policy, they actually compel states to un-
dermine federal initiatives in this area.”).  
 22. In theory, governments can run surpluses in good years so that they 
can avoid borrowing money in bad years; the alternative is constantly raising 
tax rates. See Claire Suddath, A Brief History of the U.S. Deficit, TIME.COM, 
Aug. 25, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1918390,00.html 
(“The federal government’s spending oscillated over the subsequent decades 
[following World War II], running a surplus in the good years and a deficit in 
the bad ones, until the early 1980s.”). 
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B. THE CASE AGAINST DEBT 
Although debt can spread the costs of government projects 
more fairly among time-dispersed beneficiaries, it can also 
spread costs in an unfair or unwise manner. Later generations 
of ratepayers may find themselves bearing the burden of repay-
ing debt for projects from which they derive little or no benefit. 
The likelihood of misapportioning the burden of debt repay-
ments is high due to the often perverse incentives politicians 
encounter when deciding whether to incur debt in the first 
place.23 The ready availability of debt can also encourage prof-
ligate government spending. 
The use of debt entrenches the budget and policy choices of 
an earlier era on later generations of ratepayers. The genera-
tion incurring the debt makes decisions about what and how to 
spend debt proceeds. While those decisionmakers may try to 
account for the interests of later generations, they do not have 
perfect foresight. As a result, their decisions necessarily accord 
more to their taste (and benefit) than the tastes and benefit of 
later ratepayers. Benefits to later taxpayers are contingent on 
whether later developments take place. Technological or eco-
nomic changes may reduce the value of governmental assets, 
for example, leaving later ratepayers paying more than their 
“fair share” of the debt. Further, the economic lifetime of a 
project may be overstated, resulting in nonbeneficiaries bearing 
some of the project costs. A debt-financed sports stadium, for 
example, yields few benefits if the sports team for which it was 
built moves,24 or the sport falls out of public favor. 
Many public projects have limited resale value in the event 
their public value plummets. Sports stadia are far less market-
able than, say, excess office buildings—and even used office 
buildings may become technologically obsolete and worth less 
than their outstanding mortgage. Debt-financed projects that 
appear at the time of construction to properly spread the cost of 
 
 23. See infra notes 29–30 and accompanying text (describing perverse 
incentives). 
 24. Few teams actually move. Instead, they threaten to move unless the 
host city provides yet another new stadium, rendering an existing (and often 
fully functional) stadium obsolete. See Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Public 
Finance of Sports Stadia: Controversial But Permissible . . . Time for Federal 
Income Tax Relief for State and Local Taxpayers, 1 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 
135, 137 (2002) (discussing Pittsburgh providing the Pirates with a new sta-
dium, plus paying for demolition and retirement of outstanding debt on the old 
stadium); id. at 158 (commenting on Memphis building a new basketball sta-
dium to attract a team only ten years after building a $65 million arena).  
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a long-lived asset among time-dispersed taxpayers may turn 
out to be a white elephant for the later taxpayers.25  
This problem of potential misallocation is made more se-
rious by the intractability of the question of the “correct” alloca-
tion of expenses. The dividing line between governmental ex-
penditures generating future benefits and those providing only 
current benefits is far from clear. Educational expenses provide 
a perfect example of this dilemma. On the one hand, current 
expenditures on education primarily benefit current children 
(or their families). Further, education is a recurring expense; 
unless and until people stop having children, it will cost mon-
ey—often a substantial amount—to educate those children. Fi-
nancing the education of the current generation of children 
through debt may leave the next generation bearing the fiscal 
burden of educating two generations of children.26 On the other 
hand, later residents benefit somewhat from the education of 
earlier generations, if only because educated children are more 
likely to grow up to become gainfully employed adults, adults 
who will be responsible and taxpaying members of their com-
munity (not to mention their families) and who will be unable 
to capture completely the benefits of their educational invest-
ments.27 Underfunding public education now is very likely to 
generate adverse repercussions for future generations, which 
these generations might be willing to pay to avoid. 
It is possible to make a similar argument for the future 
utility of virtually any governmental expenditure. Current pub-
lic safety expenditures prevent jurisdictions from descending 
into chaos, which would be expensive, and perhaps not even 
possible, to remedy at some future date. Allocating between the 
current and future benefits of particular expenditures would in 
most cases be practically and even theoretically impossible.28 
 
 25. See, e.g., Seymour Harris, Postwar Public Debt, in POSTWAR 
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 169, 177 (Seymour Harris ed., 1943) (“The net effect of 
. . . public debt will depend on the value of the assets created in the process of 
public investment . . . .”). 
 26. Of course, the second generation may decide to push the cost of edu-
cating its children onto the third generation. 
 27. See Walter McMahon, The Social and External Benefits of Education, 
in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION 211, 217 
(Geraint Johnes & Jill Johnes eds., 2007) (noting that the economic advantag-
es of education “operate very slowly and are long delayed, most primarily af-
fecting future generations”). 
 28. See Elliott, supra note 17, at 1093 (questioning whether it is possible 
to measure “the benefits to future generations from the ‘human capital’ 
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This leaves considerable room for current taxpayers, and the 
politicians representing them, to justify to themselves the shift-
ing of the economic burden of financing current governmental 
expenditures to future generations.  
Unfortunately, both politicians and their constituents have 
an incentive to shift the economic burden of financing current 
governmental expenditures to future generations of ratepayers. 
Even the most public-spirited politician must worry about the 
next election, and there is no question that forcing constituents 
to live within a particular budget is bad for a politician’s future. 
Fed an incessant diet of tales about governmental waste and 
abuse, the public regularly punishes officials with the temerity 
to point out that a desired level of public services is incompati-
ble with budget constraints, necessitating either a tax increase 
or a decrease in government services.29 Issuing debt is one way 
to bridge the gap between public expectations and fiscal reality.  
Debt also allows politicians to finance new, politically pop-
ular projects without imposing the corresponding cost on their 
current constituency. They may begin job-generating projects 
and construct other public goods in the short term, with the 
bills coming due only after the next election (or the politician’s 
retirement).30 Profligate spending often increases politicians’ 
popularity in the short run.31 
 
created by a school lunch program, or for that matter, the alleged increase in 
national security that comes from building an additional MX missile”). 
 29. See Nancy C. Staudt, Constitutional Politics and Balanced Budgets, 
1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1105, 1128 (“[O]ne of the surest ways for congressional 
representatives to lose political support is to impose costs upon their constitu-
ents through tax increases or spending decreases.”); Catherine Rampell, Stif-
fening Political Backbones, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2010, at WK-5, available at 
2010 WLNR 3111739 (“[P]oliticians see fiscal profligacy as a prerequisite for 
re-election . . . .”). The story is no different at the state and local level. See 
Matt Bai, State of Distress, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2009 (Magazine), at MM-38, 
available at 2009 WLNR 21157948 (describing how governors “find themselves 
retreating to a kind of fiscal Honalee, a make-believe world in which the state 
can magically raise less revenue and spend ever more of it”). Nor is this a pe-
culiarly American phenomenon. See Staring into the Abyss, ECONOMIST, July 
10–16, 2010, at 23, 24 (“As Jean-Claude Juncker, prime minister of Luxem-
bourg, said memorably in 2007: ‘We all know what to do, but we don’t know 
how to get re-elected once we have done it.’”). 
 30. See Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Home Rule, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1241, 
1259 (2009) (“Debt can be a dangerous tool in the hands of local officials who 
have incentives to spend money in the short term, especially money that has 
to be repaid only when they have left office.”).  
 31. See A. Prskawetz, Government Debt, Budget Surplus, and Popularity 
of Politicians, 98 J. OPTIMIZATION THEORY & APPLICATIONS 131, 146 (1998) (not-
ing that over the long term “it is optimal for the politician to alternate phases 
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C. THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL CONTROLS ON GOVERNMENT 
DEBT 
Both current events and history provide examples of un-
wise borrowing by all levels of government. These fiscal disas-
ters resulted in constitutional and statutory restrictions on the 
ability of governments to incur debt. Such restrictions come in 
many forms, from balanced-budget requirements (which argua-
bly reduce or eliminate the need to take out debt),32 to volume 
caps and procedural restrictions on incurring debt, to prohibi-
tions against extending credit to private corporations or indi-
viduals. 
Constitutional limitations on the use of state government 
debt did not appear until the 1840s.33 The first limitations were 
a response to fiscal crises caused by overbuilding of railroads 
and canals.34 State governments,35 directly or indirectly, funded 
much of this overbuilding and when the projects failed to gen-
erate profits, state governments were left responsible for pay-
ing off massive amounts of debt.36 Nineteen states enacted con-
stitutional restrictions on state debt between 1840 and 1855.37 
Many southern states enacted similar constitutional restric-
tions on state debt in the 1870s following the excesses of the 
Reconstruction period.38 Virtually all of the limitations re-
quired specific voter approval before state debt could be in-
 
of savings (primary surplus) and spending (primary deficit), since the margin-
al gain in popularity from an additional dollar spent is sufficiently large”). 
 32. Whether a balanced-budget requirement actually reduces debt de-
pends in part on whether the funds required to pay for budgeted expenses can 
be raised through debt or must come from current tax or fee exactions. See in-
fra text accompanying notes 204–08 (describing Chicago’s balanced-budget re-
quirement).  
 33. See Stewart E. Sterk & Elizabeth Goldman, Controlling Legislative 
Shortsightedness: The Effectiveness of Constitutional Debt Limitations, 1991 
WIS. L. REV. 1301, 1309 (“[P]rior to 1840 no state constitution contained a lim-
itation on debt . . . .”). 
 34. See id. at 1308 (describing interstate competition leading to duplica-
tion of facilities). 
 35. State support was provided in the form of loans, complimentary loan 
guarantees, and stock subscriptions financed by debt. See id. (describing meth-
ods of state support of railroad and canal projects). 
 36. See id. (noting that “several states ultimately repudiated their debts” 
as a result of this fiscal crisis). 
 37. Id. at 1309. 
 38. Id. at 1311–12. 
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curred39 and proscribed the grant of state credit to private cor-
porations or enterprises.40 
Almost incredibly, local governments then fell into the 
same fiscal trap, often involving the same industries, as the 
states had a few years earlier. With states ruled out as a source 
of financing, railroads turned to local governments as a source 
of funds. Repeating history, many local governments issued 
bonds and made other debt-financed investments on behalf of 
railroads, only to see the investments (and their own finances) 
sour.41 This led, by the 1870s, to the inclusion of constitutional 
and statutory restrictions on the authority of municipalities to 
issue debt similar to those imposed on states.42 Like the provi-
sions applicable to state-issued debt, those applicable to local 
debt consisted of a hodgepodge of restrictions, including mone-
tary limits on the amount of outstanding debt,43 referendum 
 
 39. See B.U. RATCHFORD, AMERICAN STATE DEBTS 433–35 & tbl.38 (1941) 
(categorizing state restrictions and explaining the differences between the cat-
egories). Some state debt was exempted from the requirements. For example, 
New York’s constitution gave its legislature the right to issue unlimited debt 
“to repel invasion, suppress insurrection, or defend in time of war.” See Sterk 
& Goldman, supra note 33, at 1309. See generally A. JAMES HEINS, 
CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS AGAINST STATE DEBT 11 tbl.4 (1963) (outlin-
ing exceptions to state limitations on debt); D. Roderick Kiewiet & Kristin 
Szakaly, Constitutional Limitations on Borrowing: An Analysis of State 
Bonded Indebtedness, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 62, 67 tbl.1 (1996) (charting state 
constitutional limitations on state-guaranteed long-term debt).  
 40. See HEINS, supra note 39, at 11 (“Indirect pledging of a state’s credit for 
the benefit of local governments or private individuals is generally prohibited.”). 
 41. Sterk & Goldman, supra note 33, at 1312–13. 
 42. See Clayton P. Gillette, Direct Democracy and Debt, 13 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 365, 371 (2004) [hereinafter Gillette, Democracy and Debt] (dis-
cussing restrictions on local government debt enacted subsequent to the Panic 
of 1873); Gillette, supra note 30, at 1255–56 (“Virtually every state constitu-
tion imposes limits on the amount of debt that its political subdivisions can 
issue in order to fund capital projects . . . .”); Sterk & Goldman, supra note 33, 
at 1313 & n.72 (“Today municipal debt limitations are nearly as common a 
feature in state constitutions as are limitations on state debt.”); Paul K. Bar-
dack, Comment, State Constitutional Prohibitions Against the Lending of State 
Credit to Municipal Corporations, 26 AM. U. L. REV. 657, 667 (1977). 
 43. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. XII, § 225 (limiting debt to twenty percent 
of the value of the property in the jurisdiction in municipalities of fewer than 
6000 people); ARIZ. CONST. art. IX, § 8 (limiting debt to six percent of assessed 
property value, rising to fifteen percent or twenty percent if approved by ma-
jority vote); GA. CONST. art. IX, § V, para. I (limiting debt to ten percent of as-
sessed property value); HAW. CONST. art. VII, § 13 (limiting debt to fifteen 
percent of assessed values); IND. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 (limiting debt to two 
percent of taxable property); KY. CONST. § 158 (depending on type of local enti-
ty, limiting debt to two, three, five, or ten percent of assessed property value); 
N.M. CONST. art. IX, § 13 (limiting debt to four percent of the value of taxable 
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requirements for issuing debt,44 and public-purpose or credit-
lending clauses.45 
It is easier to enact restrictions than to enforce them in a 
meaningful fashion. As Part II describes, both state and local 
governments have found myriad ways to circumvent applicable 
constitutional debt limitations. Privatization debt is only the 
latest in a long series of evasive techniques. 
II.  THE AVOIDANCE OF RESTRICTIONS ON DEBT   
The constitutional debt restrictions imposed on state and 
local governments have a limited effect on actually controlling 
the amount of governmental debt. Some restrictions are overtly 
procedural in nature, requiring, for example, a voter referen-
dum before the issuance of debt (or debt in excess of a certain 
amount), rather than limiting the amount of government 
debt.46 Even explicit constitutional restrictions on the amount 
 
property); N.D. CONST. art. X, § 15 (limiting debt to five percent of assessed 
value of property, but allowing some entities to increase indebtedness by 
another three or five percent by referendum); WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 6 (lim-
iting debt to 1.5 percent of taxable authority, which may be raised to five per-
cent if approved by three-fifths of voters in an election); WIS. CONST. art. XI, 
§ 3 (limiting debt to five percent of assessed value of property, except for cer-
tain school districts that are allowed ten percent); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 43605 
(West 1983) (limiting city debt for public improvements to fifteen percent of 
assessed property); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 106 (2005) (limiting debt to six-
teen percent of assessed value of real estate); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 30-A, § 5702 
(1964) (limiting debt to 7.5 percent of assessed property value, or up to fifteen 
percent if loans are for school, sewer, water, or airport purposes); MINN. STAT. 
§ 475.53 (2010) (depending on the type of local entity, limiting debt to two to 
3.67 percent of property value and fifteen percent for school districts); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 21-33-303 (1972) (limiting debt to fifteen percent of property val-
ue); MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-7-4201 (2009) (limiting debt to 2.5 percent of as-
sessed property value); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-12-2 (Supp. 2008) (limiting debt to 
three percent of assessed value of property). 
 44. See Gillette, Democracy and Debt, supra note 42, at 370 (“The consti-
tutions of approximately twenty-seven states require a vote of the electorate 
prior to the issuance of municipal debt.”). 
 45. See Bardack, supra note 42, at 664 (“[F]orty-four states generally for-
bid loans of credit to or on behalf of any public or private corporation . . . .”); 
Gillette, supra note 30, at 1256 (noting the addition of constitutional public 
purpose requirements). 
 46. See Gillette, Democracy and Debt, supra note 42, at 370 (noting that 
twenty-seven states have these constitutional voting requirements); see also, 
e.g., ALA. CONST. art. XI, § 213 (stating that state debt must be authorized by 
a two-thirds vote of each house of the legislature); id. art. XII, § 222 (stating 
that debt must be authorized by a majority vote); ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 9 
(stating that bonds must be authorized by the locality’s governing body plus 
majority vote of electorate); CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 18 (stating that, in most 
cases, local bonds must be authorized by a two-thirds majority in bond elec-
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of state debt can be effectively waived by strategically amend-
ing the constitution; in many states the barriers to such 
amendment are the same voter (or legislative majority or su-
permajority) approvals required under the state’s procedural 
debt restrictions.47 However, obtaining legislative or voter ap-
proval for debt transactions can be expensive and inconven-
ient48 or, not always for good reasons, impossible.49 Conse-
quently, instead of going this route, both state and local 
jurisdictions often enter into transactions with economic effects 
similar if not identical to debt but which are deliberately struc-
tured to avoid debt restrictions. As elaborated below, they may 
avoid restrictions by creating new jurisdictions or by engaging 
in transactions which are economically similar to debt but 
which courts have not treated as debt. Privatization techniques 
are merely a recent addition to this long-established tradition 
of avoidance. 
A. CREATING NEW JURISDICTIONS 
State and local governments can often avoid debt limita-
tions by creating “new” jurisdictions. In many states, some 
types of jurisdictions are not subject to prevailing limitations 
(including referendum requirements) on government debt and 
states avoid the limitations by creating those special types of 
 
tion); IDAHO CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (stating that local bonds must be authorized 
by a two-thirds majority in bond election); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 142-83 (2008) 
(stating that local bonds must be authorized by majority vote). 
 47. See Kiewiet & Szakaly, supra note 39, at 68 (noting instances where 
state constitutional provisions regarding guaranteed debt become “substan-
tially altered” over time); Sterk & Goldman, supra note 33, at 1316 (“[I]f a 
state’s constitution permits amendment whenever a public referendum ratifies 
a proposal made by the legislature, an outright constitutional prohibition is 
not significantly different from a provision that permits borrowing after ap-
proval by the voters.”). Though constitutional and statutory restrictions on lo-
cal debt issuances presumably also could be waived by state legislatures, local 
governments may lack the necessary power in the state legislature to obtain 
such waivers. 
 48. See Gillette, Democracy and Debt, supra note 42, at 374–75 (“Finally, 
bond elections themselves impose significant costs on the localities that hold 
them. These are not only the costs related to the bond election itself, which 
frequently occurs at times other than the general election and thus requires 
marshalling the resources of election officials and inducing constituents to 
turn out to vote on a single issue, but also delay in issuing debt and the risk 
that voters will fail to represent the preferences of constituents as a whole.”). 
 49. See id. at 401 (summarizing benign and malignant stories explaining 
referenda outcomes). 
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jurisdictions.50 In others, the cap on debt may not affect a new 
jurisdiction because it has no preexisting debt. Most critically, 
these new jurisdictions may overlap, or even have boundaries 
identical to, the territorial boundaries delineating the older ju-
risdictions, thereby circumventing the older jurisdictions’ refer-
endum requirements or debt restrictions.51 In one infamous 
case, after the voters of King County voted down the tax in-
crease necessary to finance the bonds needed to construct a 
new stadium for the Seattle Mariners’ baseball team, the 
Washington State legislature simply created a new “public fa-
cilities district” with the power to issue bonds to build a sta-
dium without the necessity of a taxpayer referendum.52  
The creation of overlapping jurisdictions permits a given 
piece of property to be subject to debt at levels far in excess of 
those allowed in any single jurisdiction. Repayment of such 
high levels of debt may necessitate tax levies that in the best 
case make it difficult for future governments to fund their own 
priorities and in the worst case are financially unsustainable. 
Stated simply, taxpayers may rebel against paying taxes suffi-
cient both to defray the costs of past obligations and new spend-
ing initiatives. Future governments, bound by their obligation 
to pay off past debts, may have little if any money left over to 
spend on their own projects. Yet courts repeatedly accede to 
this method of avoiding debt limitations.53 
 
 50. Governmental entities denominated “public building authorities” are 
often exempt from state debt-limitation rules. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, 
supra note 17, at 776 (“Early on, public authority debt was held not to be the 
debt of its parent government, and was, thus, not subject to the parent gov-
ernment’s debt restrictions.”); CLAYTON P. GILLETTE & LYNN A. BAKER, LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 639–40 (2d ed. 1999) (describing 
the use of public authorities and problems posed by them); C. Robert Morris, 
Jr., Evading Debt Limitations with Public Building Authorities: The Costly 
Subversion of State Constitutions, 68 YALE L.J. 234, 234 (1958) (describing 
building authorities as “the most recent” of the “evasive devices and fine dis-
tinctions [that] are employed to escape debt limitations”); Sterk & Goldman, 
supra note 33, at 1333 (describing the use of “public ‘authorities’” to evade 
debt restrictions). 
 51. AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 19, at 213–14. 
 52. See CLEAN v. Washington, 928 P.2d 1054, 1056–58 (Wash. 1996) (de-
scribing events leading up to the formation of the public facilities district). 
 53. See, e.g., Pinion v. Walker Cnty. Sch. Dist., 45 S.E.2d 405, 407 (Ga. 
1947) (stating that “the frequently applied construction of this provision is 
that each separate political division of the State which has authority to issue 
bonds is authorized to incur an indebtedness up to 7% of the assessed valua-
tion of its taxable property independently of any existing indebtedness of 
another distinct and separate municipality or other political body whose terri-
tory might be coextensive in whole or in part with that of its own,” and holding 
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Creating new jurisdictions is only the first of many escapes 
from the impact of debt limitations. Another time-honored 
method54 of avoiding the restrictions on debt is to use debt that 
does not count as “debt” subject to constitutional or statutory 
restrictions.  
B. THE SPECIAL-FUNDS EXCEPTION 
Many courts have held that debt payable out of a dedicated 
revenue source or “special fund” does not constitute “debt” sub-
ject to constitutional restrictions.55 There is some logic to ex-
 
that a consolidated school district was not required to take into account the 
indebtedness of former local school districts in computing the amount of indebt-
edness it was authorized to incur); McLain v. Phelps, 100 N.E.2d 753, 757 (Ill. 
1951) (observing that “if the rule [limiting debt] were applied to the property, 
and not to the power of each separate taxing district, municipal corporations 
would be hampered and restricted far more than ever contemplated” and 
upholding a levy that would raise total bond principal to 7.3 percent of as-
sessed value); Indianapolis v. Buckner, 116 N.E.2d 507, 509 (Ind. 1954) (“But 
this [two-percent debt] limit applies to each corporation individually, not in 
the aggregate to all properly created municipal corporations which may cover 
the same area or include the same taxpayers.”). See generally AMDURSKY & 
GILLETTE, supra note 19, at 213–14 (“Cook County, Illinois seems to be a per-
ennial favorite of commentators concerned with overlapping political entities, 
many of which appear to have been created primarily to avoid tax and debt 
limitations. . . . [F]ew jurisdictions have limited the ability of overlapping ju-
risdictions to extend debt beyond apparent constitutional limits.”). 
 54. See RATCHFORD, supra note 39, at 446 (“Arguments in favor of the 
special fund doctrine were first advanced in New York in 1852 . . . .”). 
 55. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 49 So.2d 175, 181–82 (Ala. 1950) 
(holding that bonds are not “indebtedness of the municipality” when payable 
out of revenues derived by the corporation from the lease or sale of its facili-
ties); State ex rel. Atkinson v. Planned Indus. Expansion Auth., 517 S.W.2d 36, 
47 (Mo. 1975) (en banc) (“‘If the obligation to be incurred is payable solely from 
income derived from the operation of the proposed improvement, the obliga-
tion is not considered to be debt of the city within the meaning of the constitu-
tional restrictions . . . .’” (quoting City of St. Louis v. Sommers, 266 S.W.2d 
753, 755 (Ala. 1954))). See generally RATCHFORD, supra note 39, at 465 (“Per-
haps many courts thought that they were merely making the constitutions 
flexible and practical when they recognized the special fund doctrine, but in 
several instances they have practically nullified the limitations by a liberal 
interpretation of the doctrine.”); Sterk & Goldman, supra note 33, at 1330–31 
(“Courts have often construed debt to be repaid out of a ‘special fund,’ derived 
solely from revenues of a specific project, as falling outside the scope of consti-
tutional debt limitations.”). Indeed, some state constitutions now expressly ex-
empt revenue bonds from the limitations applicable to other government debt. 
See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 11 (“The restrictions on contracting debt do 
not apply to debt incurred through the issuance of revenue bonds . . . .”); FLA. 
CONST. art. VII, § 11(d) (exempting revenue bonds from referendum require-
ment); GA. CONST. art. IX, § 6, para. 1 (providing that revenue bonds “shall not 
be deemed to be a debt of the issuing political subdivision”). 
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cluding industrial revenue bonds, which limit municipal liabili-
ty to interest or rents actually received from the debt-financed 
property, from debt limitations. After all, the interest or rental 
income the government receives from the property financed 
with bond proceeds would not have been derived had the prop-
erty not been constructed, and the property would not have 
been constructed absent the government loan. Further, if the 
investment in the property goes sour, the bondholders rather 
than the municipality suffer the consequences of any default.56 
Thus, a government cannot be worse off going forward than it 
would have been had it not entered into this type of loan trans-
action.57 However, some courts have extended the special-funds 
exemption to debt financed with the proceeds of taxes that 
could have been levied, with the same amount of revenue 
raised, in the absence of the project funded by the debt.58 For 
 
 56. See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 9, at 187 (observing that the local gov-
ernment bears no risk). 
 57. See AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 19, at 177 (“Risk analysis sug-
gests that no debt within the constitutional provision exists in such a case.”). 
Such debts do not place preexisting government revenues at risk; bond pur-
chasers (creditors), and not the government issuing the bond, bear the risk 
that the financed enterprise may fail and the expected rents not materialize. 
See id. at 162 (“Hence, the concern about fiscal overextension of the issuer’s 
constituents—the concern that generated the trend towards debt limits—does 
not come into play.”). Indeed, the government’s role is limited to providing 
access to the federal tax benefits accorded state and municipal debt under 
§ 103 of the Internal Revenue Code. See 26 U.S.C. § 103 (2006); KLEIN ET AL., 
supra note 9, at 187 (“[T]he local government unit that is the purported bor-
rower is strictly an intermediary, with no financial risk.”). By passing the re-
sulting rate advantage along to the enterprise being financed, a municipality 
encourages investment within its borders. See AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra 
note 19, at 30–31 (“These bonds have been used to induce manufacturers to 
locate in particular areas since they were first employed in Mississippi in the 
1930s.”); Norman R. Williams & Brannon P. Denning, The “New Protection-
ism” and the American Common Market, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 247, 252 
(2009) (“This favorable tax treatment significantly reduces the private compa-
nies’ cost of borrowing, and . . . provides local private enterprises with a sub-
stantial economic edge . . . .”). Such investment may (or may not) bring desira-
ble jobs and tax revenues with it. See Peter S. Fisher & Alan H. Peters, Tax 
and Spending Incentives and Enterprise Zones, NEW ENG. ECON. REV., 
Mar./Apr. 1997, at 109, 128 (reviewing literature on the impact of industrial 
revenue bonds and concluding the results are “mixed”); Sherry L. Jarrell et al., 
Law and Economics of Regulating Local Economic Development Incentives, 41 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 805, 826 (2006) (“Studies on the impact of industrial 
revenue bonds offer no firm conclusions . . . .”). 
 58. See AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 19, at 183 (“The key distinc-
tion, overlooked in these cases, between these situations and true revenue 
bonds is the independence of the revenue source from the project financed 
with bond proceeds.”); HEINS, supra note 39, at 16 (“The crux of the matter is 
that, with proper manipulation of borrowing technique to fit the rules of law of 
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example, gasoline taxes have been deemed “special funds” 
when “pledged to the payment of bonds issued for roads and 
bridges,”59 even though the jurisdiction could have raised those 
taxes without expending the corresponding revenue on roads 
and bridges. 
In one recent variation on this theme, tax increment fi-
nancing (TIF) jurisdictions borrow money by issuing bonds, the 
proceeds of which are used to provide infrastructure and other 
improvements in a specific geographic area, the “tax increment 
district.”60 The expectation is that the improvements will in-
crease property values or economic activity in the district; the 
bonds are expressly made payable only out of the property (or 
other) taxes attributable either to that increase in value or to 
increases in economic activity within the district.61 If there is 
no increase in value or associated tax revenues, the bondhold-
ers—rather than the issuing jurisdiction—suffer the financial 
loss.62 There is no guarantee, however, that an increase in 
 
a particular state, a state may use revenue bonds to finance public improve-
ments that were seemingly prohibited when constitutional debt limitations 
were adopted.”); RATCHFORD, supra note 39, at 465 (“[I]n several instances 
they have practically nullified the limitations by a liberal interpretation of the 
doctrine.”); Sterk & Goldman, supra note 33, at 1331 (“Excluding special tax 
debt from constitutional limitations on debt, then, limits the effectiveness of 
those limitations.”). Not all states extend the special funds exception to its lim-
it. See GILLETTE & BAKER, supra note 50, at 625 (describing the “narrow con-
ception of the special fund doctrine” prevailing in some states); Sterk & Gold-
man, supra note 33, at 1331 & n.138 (“Some courts, however, refuse to embrace 
this application of the special fund doctrine because financing through special 
taxes creates an obligation out of state taxes that could have been imposed 
and dedicated to projects other than the ones actually financed.”). 
 59. AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 19, at 182. 
 60. See Richard Briffault, The Most Popular Tool: Tax Increment Financ-
ing and the Political Economy of Local Government, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 65, 67–
68 (2010) (“More commonly for larger TIF districts, the district may issue 
bonds backed by the projected incremental revenues. The bond proceeds are 
then used to make major public investments upfront, thus jumpstarting the 
development process.”). 
 61. See id. at 67 (explaining use of property taxes); id. at 68–69 (“In ap-
proximately eighteen states, nonproperty taxes, particularly the sales tax or 
other economic activity taxes, can be committed to TIF programs. These states 
also rely on the theory that they are using incremental revenues . . . .”). 
 62. See Christina G. Dudley, Note, Tax Increment Financing for Redevel-
opment in Missouri: Beauty and the Beast, 54 UMKC L. REV. 77, 85 (1985) 
(“[I]nvestors . . . will be left empty-handed if the anticipated revenue does not 
materialize.”). Whether municipalities actually allow defaults to occur with 
respect to TIF bonds is an open question. See Josh Reinert, Note, Tax Incre-
ment Financing in Missouri: Is It Time for Blight and But-For to Go?, 45 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 1019, 1028 (2001) (“[D]efault is generally considered to be the 
option of last resort. Prior to taking this step, the municipality may either re-
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property values or tax revenues within the district is actually 
the result of the expenditures financed with the bond 
proceeds.63 Indeed, jurisdictions can be left significantly worse 
off when the valuation “increase” is simply the product of infla-
tion, especially if the improvements themselves increase city 
operating costs.64 The tax revenues attributable to the increase 
go to the bondholders; meanwhile, the jurisdictions are left 
with the same number of nominal tax dollars as before to pay 
their higher operational costs. Either they have to reduce the 
quantum of services provided or raise their tax rates, forcing 
their residents to pay higher taxes (even in inflation-adjusted 
terms).65 Nonetheless, most TIF statutes expressly exempt TIF 
 
duce its expenditures in the other project areas, or utilize intragovernmental 
grants or other interest income to service the debt.” (citations omitted)). 
 63. See Briffault, supra note 60, at 80–83 (discussing economic studies 
suggesting TIF’s relative ineffectiveness at spurring economic development). 
 64. See Rachel Weber et al., The Effect of Tax Increment Financing on 
School District Revenues: Regional Variation and Interjurisdictional Competi-
tion, 40 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 27, 27–28 (2008) (speculating that “overlapping 
governments may raise tax rates to compensate” for TIF revenue losses, un-
less constrained by tax caps); id. at 29–30 (summarizing study results); Joseph 
F. Luther, Note, Tax Increment Financing: Municipalities Avoiding Voter Ac-
countability, 1 DETROIT C. L. REV. 89, 104–05 (1987) (“[T]he school districts 
will be forced to ask the voters for a new school millage increase just so that 
they can stay abreast of inflation.”); Alyson Tomme, Note, Tax Increment Fi-
nancing: Public Use or Private Abuse?, 90 MINN. L. REV. 213, 233–34 (2005) 
(“Municipal-service costs, such as police, fire, sanitation, and transportation, 
typically rise as TIF projects develop. Since property taxes for those property 
owners within the TIF district are based upon assessments made before the 
commencement of the TIF project, property taxes collected within the district 
are likely to fall short of being able to meet the increasing cost of municipal 
services. Consequently, taxpayers outside the district may be called on to pay 
additional taxes to account for lost revenue.”). But see Randall V. Reece & M. 
Duane Coyle, Urban Redevelopment: Utilization of Tax Increment Financing, 
19 WASHBURN L.J. 536, 542 (1980) (“[A]ny such indirect subsidies may be 
more than recouped by increased sales taxes from new commercial growth 
within the redevelopment area.”); Michael L. Molinaro, Comment, Tax Incre-
ment Financing: A New Source of Funds for Community Redevelopment in Il-
linois—People ex rel. City of Canton v. Crouch, 30 DEPAUL L. REV. 459, 475 
(1981) (“[T]ax increment financing does not necessarily require additional mu-
nicipal services because substandard property often demands more public ser-
vices than properly maintained property. Other potential infirmities of tax in-
crement financing may be avoided through carefully drafted statutes.”). 
 65. Suppose property values in the TIF district start at $1 million and res-
idents pay a property tax equal to two percent of that value, or $20,000. That 
$20,000 is used to run the local schools. Then, because of inflation (and only 
because of inflation) the value of the property in the TIF district increases to 
$1.1 million. Although (assuming the same tax rate) tax collections go up to 
$22,000, the $2000 increase would go to make payments on the TIF bonds. Al-
though the district would still have $20,000 to pay school expenses, that 
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debt from municipal debt limits.66 In several (though not all) of 
the states where the debt limitations are imposed by the state 
constitution rather than statute, courts have found that TIF 
bonds fall within the special-funds exception to those limita-
tions.67  
C. SHORT-TERM DEBT 
Another avoidance mechanism involves the use of short-
term debt, usually in the form of a “note.”68 Governments issue 
short-term notes to “regulate cash flow”69 by evening out the liq-
uidity issues stemming from the irregular collection of tax rev-
enues or delays in the issuance of longer-term bonds.70 In many 
states, either by statute or constitutional provision, such short-
term debt is excluded from generally applicable debt limita-
 
$20,000 would not go as far as the previous year’s $20,000 because of inflation. 
The same package of goods and services would now cost the schools $22,000. 
To raise an additional $2000, the district would have to raise tax rates, and 
increase the tax burden on its residents not only in nominal terms, but also in 
inflation-adjusted terms.  
 66. See Briffault, supra note 60, at 76. 
 67. See id. at 76 & n.57 (naming Missouri, Indiana, Colorado, and Flori-
da); Dudley, supra note 62, at 103–04 (mentioning Utah, Colorado, and Mis-
souri); Julie A. Goshorn, Note, In a TIF: Why Missouri Needs Tax Increment 
Financing Reform, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 919, 941 (1999) (identifying Indiana, Col-
orado, Florida, Utah, and Missouri). Other state courts have disagreed, and 
held that TIF bonds are real debt subject to the states’ particular constitution-
al limitations, at least when they are funded by increases in property tax rev-
enues. See Briffault, supra note 60, at 76 n.57 (naming Oklahoma, West Vir-
ginia, and Wisconsin); Dudley, supra note 62, at 104 (discussing Iowa, 
Arizona, Kentucky, and South Dakota); Goshorn, supra, at 938–39 (mention-
ing Iowa, Arizona, South Dakota, Kentucky, and Wisconsin). Some state legis-
latures have tried to avoid this issue by fixing assessment values for tax pur-
poses at the inception of the TIF and calling the amounts paid into the special 
bond repayment fund “payments in lieu of taxes” or “PILOTs.” Reinert, supra 
note 62, at 1026–27. Some states have avoided the issue by mandating or al-
lowing TIF bonds to be funded by incremental sales tax revenues. See, e.g., LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:9033.3 (2009) (allowing these bonds). Wisconsin courts, 
notwithstanding their adverse holding on TIF bonds funded by incremental 
property tax revenues, have held that bonds issued by a baseball park district 
payable out of incremental sales and use taxes did not constitute “debt” sub-
ject to that state’s debt limitations. Libertarian Party of Wis. v. State, 546 
N.W.2d 424 (Wis. 1996). 
 68. See AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 19, at 33 (describing “tax an-
ticipation notes” (TANs), “revenue anticipation notes” (RANs), “tax and reve-
nue anticipation notes” (TRANs), and “bond anticipation notes” (BANs)). 
 69. See id. at 33–34. 
 70. See id. 
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tions.71 Even in the absence of explicit provisions, courts gener-
ally hold that such notes do not fall within the definition of 
“debt” subject to constitutional restrictions because they are 
expected to be redeemed out of current-year tax revenues.72 
However, some states have issued debt in excess of the taxes 
expected to be received by the end of the fiscal year, essentially 
creating long-term debt by rolling over the short-term debt for 
several successive years.73 Although some state courts have 
cracked down on this practice,74 other courts have been permis-
sive largely because they have not wanted to be in the business 
of determining whether the state legislature meant to issue 
more notes than could be currently repaid or if the excess was 
accidental.75 
D. PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS 
Property tax concessions are yet another means of escaping 
debt limitations.76 One way for a jurisdiction to attract business 
 
 71. Some state constitutions explicitly provide that such notes do not 
count as “debt” subject to the general limitations. See Georgetown v. Elliott, 95 
F.2d 774, 775 (4th Cir. 1938) (interpreting article 8, section 7 of the constitution 
of South Carolina); Bremen v. Regions Bank, 559 S.E.2d 440, 443 (Ga. 2002) 
(describing special limitations applicable to “temporary loans” contained in 
article IX, section V, paragraph V of the Georgia Constitution). Others provide 
the same by statute. See Berkeley High Sch. Dist. of Alameda Cnty. v. Coit, 59 
P.2d 992, 996–97 (Cal. 1936) (upholding the legality of section 3719 of the Cal-
ifornia Code authorizing issuance of tax anticipation notes). For a discussion 
of the history of these rules, see Sterk & Goldman, supra note 33, at 1314–15. 
 72. See AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 19, at 180 (“Also excluded 
from debt are those obligations that are to be met out of current income and 
notes issued in anticipation of revenue to be collected during the current fiscal 
year, that is, tax or revenue anticipation notes.”).  
 73. See Christian Schnieider, The Exploding Use of Debt to Finance Gov-
ernment in Wisconsin, WIS. POL’Y RES. INST., http://www.wpri.org/Reports/ 
Volume_20/Vol20no9p1.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2011) (reporting on how 
Wisconsin debt exceeds tax revenue). 
 74. See, e.g., Pooled Money Inv. Bd. v. Unruh, 200 Cal. Rptr. 500, 507 (Ct. 
App. 1984) (holding that the absence of definite repayment requirements or 
repayment date kept “short term notes” from being exempted from referendum 
requirement applicable to state debt); Bundy v. Belin, 461 A.2d 197, 207 (Pa. 
1983) (refusing to lift a tax limitation standing in the way of generating tax 
revenues necessary to pay unpaid tax anticipation notes because “the last ves-
tige of protection against run away [sic] spending by way of tax anticipation 
notes is the tax limitation”). 
 75. See AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 19, at 33–34 (describing New 
York cases requiring plaintiff to bear the “formidable” burden of proving the 
legislature intended to run a deficit in the year issued). 
 76. See Sterk & Goldman, supra note 33, at 1317 (suggesting that consti-
tutional restrictions on tax exemptions are “first cousins” to debt limitations). 
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is to build desirable infrastructure. If a jurisdiction borrows 
money to build that infrastructure, however, the debt may be 
subject to the prevailing constitutional and statutory debt re-
strictions.77 To circumvent this restriction, some jurisdictions 
opt to make businesses build their own facilities.78 The gov-
ernment arranges to bear some of the cost of the improvements, 
however, by granting these businesses temporary property tax 
concessions, either by setting an artificially low value for their 
property or by offering a “tax holiday.”79 The business can then 
use the cash it saves by not paying taxes to pay off the obliga-
tions it owes under the debt incurred to build the infrastruc-
ture.80 As modern finance theory makes clear, all that counts is 
cash flow. From an economic perspective, the effect of both ar-
rangements is the same: both involve the dedication of tax rev-
enues to payment of the debt obligation. The government enter-
ing into a property tax concession arrangement imposes 
spending restrictions on future governments by limiting the 
amount of future tax revenues. The result would be the same if 
the government had not offered any tax concessions, collected 
higher tax revenues, and then used the increased tax revenues 
to pay off debt incurred to finance its infrastructure project. 
Both schemes leave future governments with the same amount 
of “free” tax revenues. Yet, restrictions on the amount of public 
debt do not also limit property tax concessions. Some state con-
stitutions limit “permanent” tax exemptions in ways similar to 
the ways they limit governmental debt,81 but shorter-term ex-
emptions are regularly used to attract investors to a jurisdic-
tion.82 
 
 77. See supra Part I.C. 
 78. For example, Daimler-Chrysler had to build its own plant in Toledo, 
Ohio. See Peter D. Enrich, Business Tax Incentives: A Status Report, 34 URB. 
LAW. 415, 427 (2002). 
 79. In order to attract Daimler-Chrysler, Toledo offered property tax breaks, 
which were then challenged by residents. Id. at 427. States and localities may 
offer concessions with respect to nonproperty taxes as well. Cf. id. at 416 (“In-
deed, the 1990s witnessed the continuing proliferation of new forms of tax 
breaks and the expansion and enhancement of existing forms virtually 
nationwide.”). 
 80. Cf. Sterk & Goldman, supra note 33, at 1317 (“Long-term tax exemp-
tions can be just as effective, if not more effective, [than debt] as a mechanism 
that enables legislatures to defer payment for current benefits.”). 
 81. See id. at 1317–21 (describing the development and history of “uni-
formity” and other constitutional restrictions on property tax exemptions). 
 82. See Enrich, supra note 78, at 417 (“Investment tax credits, job creation 
credits, and property tax abatement programs have become nearly universal 
. . . .”). 
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Using tax concessions rather than public debt has other 
implications. Under most tax-concession arrangements, the 
land owner—and not the government—incurs debt and con-
structs improvements, albeit with funds made available by the 
government’s reduction in its tax claim. Like other privatiza-
tion arrangements, this may lead to an efficiency gain because 
the private party may be better at negotiating and overseeing 
the construction project.83 But in a world in which debt limita-
tions exist, it is often unclear whether such arrangements are 
expected or intended to generate efficiency gains or whether 
they are being used merely to avoid statutory or constitutional 
restrictions on the overall amount of, or procedural restrictions 
applicable to, government debt. Governments may not believe 
that they are inferior negotiators or builders, just inferior bor-
rowers. 
E. LEASES 
Debt limitations also may be avoided when governments 
lease rather than purchase property. The variations of this 
technique range from simple long-term lease arrangements, to 
leases coupled with an option to purchase, to sale leaseback ar-
rangements.84 In the simplest variation of a lease agreement, a 
private investor builds a public facility, say a school building. 
The school district then enters into a long-term lease of the 
property at a rent sufficient to pay the private investor’s costs 
and also allow the private investor to make a profit. From a le-
gal perspective, the school district never becomes party to a 
debt contract. Yet, from an economic perspective, the rental 
payments required under the lease agreement are at least as 
burdensome as those that would have been due under the 
terms of a debt incurred to build the school.85 Some state courts 
have examined these transactions and recharacterized them as 
debt arrangements subject to constitutional limitations;86 but 
 
 83. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (recounting alleged efficiency 
benefits of privatization). 
 84. See infra note 89. 
 85. To provide the investor with a profit and the incentive to participate 
in the transaction, the rental payments must exceed the amounts due on the 
underlying mortgage. 
 86. Montano v. Gabaldon, 766 P.2d 1328, 1328 (N.M. 1989) (holding that a 
lease-purchase arrangement for jail qualified as debt); Sterk & Goldman, su-
pra note 33, at 1332–33 (commenting favorably on courts treating lease 
agreements as debt). See generally AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 19, at 
214–19 (discussing lease-purchase obligations and public building authorities). 
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in most states, courts uphold these transactions as long as the 
rental contract clearly provides that no rent will be due unless 
the state legislature “appropriates” the sum on an annual basis 
or describes the rental obligation as “morally,” rather than le-
gally, binding,87 despite the fact that the practical effect of 
these limiting contract terms is far from clear.88 
In sale-leaseback arrangements, the governmental owner 
of property sells it to another party while simultaneously ex-
ecuting a lease for continued use of the property.89 In such 
transactions, the original governmental owner receives a lump 
sum up front, representing the fair market value of the asset, 
but becomes obligated to make a stream of rental payments 
over the term of the lease. For example, the State of Arizona 
recently sold investors $735 million of state-owned buildings, 
including offices, arenas, and the chambers of the State Legis-
lature, which it then leased back.90 Like conventional leases, 
 
 87. See, e.g., Jennings v. Kan. City, 812 S.W.2d 724, 732 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1991) (holding that the lease of school buildings did not constitute debt when 
the city has the right to terminate the lease by failing to appropriate annual 
funds); St. Charles City-Cnty. Library Dist. v. St. Charles Library Bldg. Corp., 
627 S.W.2d 64, 68 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that the option to terminate a 
lease at the end of each year kept the lease of a library building from violating 
debt-limitation provisions); Dieck v. Unified Sch. Dist. of Antigo, 477 N.W.2d 
613, 615 (Wis. 1991) (holding that the school district did not incur debt when it 
entered into a lease-purchase agreement with a “nonappropriation option”); 
see also GILLETTE & BAKER, supra note 50, at 636 (“Courts have shared the 
Wisconsin court’s view that the [nonappropriation] clause effectively removes 
any legal obligation to make payments over the full lease term, and hence takes 
the lease outside of the scope of constitutional debt.”); Sterk & Goldman, supra 
note 33, at 1332 (discussing Bulman v. McCrane, 312 A.2d 857 (N.J. 1973)). 
 88. There is reason to doubt that nonappropriation or “morally binding” 
rental agreements are any less binding as a practical matter than agreements 
phrased in more absolute terms. See Gillette, supra note 30, at 1257 (“These 
schemes technically allow the issuing locality to cease making payments 
should the project prove inappropriate, although the subsequent loss of cred-
itworthiness means that payment is likely compelled as a practical matter.”); 
see also Lonegan v. State, 809 A.2d 91, 128 (N.J. 2002) (“A recently issued Re-
search Report by Standard & Poor’s, one of the nation’s most prominent bond 
rating agencies, explains that general obligation bond and appropriations debt 
are virtually indistinguishable as credit risks and that appropriations debt, as 
a practical matter, must be paid by the State whose agency issued the debt in 
order for that State’s credit rating to be maintained.”). In 2008, New Jersey’s 
constitution was amended to impose a public referendum requirement on such 
“appropriation” debt. See N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 2, para. 3. 
 89. See, e.g., Stephen R. Kruft, Leveraged Aircraft Leases: The Lender’s 
Perspective, 44 BUS. LAW. 737 (1989) (describing aircraft leaseback arrange-
ments). 
 90. See Peter Carbonara, Cash-Hungry States Are Putting Buildings on 
the Block, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2010, at B8, available at 2010 WLNR 9265999. 
  
2011] PRIVATIZATION AND TAX REVENUES 1989 
 
leases that are part of sale-leaseback arrangements may in-
clude buyout provisions or run for the expected lifetime of the 
property, though either set of provisions risks losing the favor-
able federal tax treatment accorded such transactions.91 In ad-
dition, the leases executed in conjunction with these arrange-
ments must meet the technical requirements needed to avoid 
the recharacterization of the arrangements as debt for state 
and federal tax law purposes.92 As an economic matter, sale-
leasebacks allow governments to cash out equity that may have 
been created by past tax collections. Looking forward, such ar-
rangements put future taxpayers in the position they would 
have been in had the government originally borrowed money to 
purchase or build the covered asset, instead of prepaying the 
expense through outright purchase.93 In a sense, these transac-
tions turn asset equity into a “rainy day fund” for the govern-
ment. Certainly, the Arizona government was able to recoup 
the money it spent in earlier years on constructing its property 
through its sale-leaseback arrangement. Of course, once a local 
government makes use of a sale-leaseback arrangement as a 
source of funding it cannot do so again, because the property 
that was sold to make the arrangement no longer belongs to the 
government. 
Sale-leasebacks have the potential to do more than merely 
place a jurisdiction in the same position it would have been in 
had it borrowed the money to construct (or purchase) the asset 
subject to the lease. Since the parties enter into the sale and 
 
 91. Asset owners are entitled to depreciation deductions, which are usual-
ly accelerated relative to economic depreciation. This acceleration generates 
time value of money gains for taxpayers with sufficient outside income against 
which the accelerated depreciated deductions can be applied. These tax bene-
fits supply part of the economic rationale for the transaction, and increase the 
price the purchaser is willing to pay for the asset. However, if the alleged own-
er of the property retains too little risk of ownership, the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) can recharacterize such transactions as mere financing ar-
rangements, insufficient to shift ownership of the assets (and their associated 
depreciation deductions) to the purchaser/lessor, thereby reducing the econom-
ic benefits of the transaction for the buyer and seller. See BORIS I. BITTKER ET 
AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 14–17 (3d ed. 2002) (“[M]any 
tax shelter arrangements entailed transfers of legal ownership of property, 
such as a movie, while associated contracts effectively shifted the benefits and 
burdens of ownership to other persons. In such cases, the taxpayers holding 
legal title to the property have been denied depreciation deductions with re-
spect to the property.”). In the Arizona transaction, the leases ran for twenty 
years, after which ownership reverts to the state. Carbonara, supra note 90.  
 92. See BITTKER ET AL., supra note 91, at 14–17. 
 93. This assertion assumes the sale and leaseback arrangements are ef-
fected at fair market value.  
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lease contemporaneously, the parties could structure such 
transactions to include an upfront sale/purchase price in excess 
of the asset’s fair market value. The government could spend 
this excess as it pleased. Inflated rental payments would then 
compensate for the initial overpayment.94 For example, suppose 
a state owned an office building that was worth $1 million, with 
an annual fair rental value of $100,000. The state could “sell” 
the building for $2 million, while agreeing to “rent” it back for 
$200,000. Essentially, both parties would pretend that the 
building was twice as valuable as it really was and act accord-
ingly. Over the term of the lease, the $100,000 of excess annual 
lease payments would compensate the purchaser for the initial 
$1 million overpayment; over time, the parties would end up in 
the same place as if the original purchase had been effected for 
$1 million. A transaction of this sort would leave later genera-
tions of ratepayers responsible for paying for more than the 
value of the benefits they receive through use of the asset cov-
ered by the lease, as they would be paying $200,000 annually to 
rent a $100,000 building. Thus far, though, jurisdictions do not 
seem to be borrowing additional money through sale-leaseback 
transactions. Instead, when that is the aim, they have turned 
to privatization transactions.95  
F. PRIVATIZATION 
In a classic privatization transaction, a private enterprise 
assumes the responsibility of operating what had been a public 
function.96 Instead of running a municipal waste operation, for 
example, a city may decide to let the job be handled by private 
haulers, with the waste deposited in a private landfill. The city 
may contract with the private enterprises on behalf of the resi-
dents, or may allow its residents to enter into contracts with 
 
 94. As demonstrated by the 1970’s tax shelter industry, when desired, 
parties can set a greatly inflated sale price that is then offset by an equally 
inflated stream of rental payments. See, e.g., Estate of Franklin v. Comm’r, 
544 F.2d 1045, 1046 (9th Cir. 1976) (describing property purchased for approx-
imately $600,000 that was sold to shelter investors for $1,224,000 shortly there-
after). Such overvaluation is grounds for loss of any associated tax benefits. 
 95. Privatization is a tool by which local governments “contract with pri-
vate companies for the provision of services.” Scott D. Maker, Local Govern-
ment, Privatization, and Antitrust Immunity, 68 FLA. B.J. 38, 38 (1994). 
 96. Id. A decision to avoid providing a service that is sometimes provided 
by government, such as garbage collection or water provision, may be regarded 
as a sub silentio privatization. However, the term seems to be used only with 
respect to decisions to abandon activities the particular government previously 
carried out. 
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the providers directly. In all contexts, privatization decisions 
raise the question of the proper scope of government. This 
question is at the heart of the current debate over national 
health care,97 but it is equally implicated in disputes over the 
use of school vouchers, charter schools, security services, and 
recreational facilities; and the answer turns, in part, on wheth-
er a public or private institution is best able to perform the 
function at the lowest cost.98 
That said, private parties are only interested in taking over 
those governmental activities that they believe can be carried 
out at a profit. With the exception, perhaps, of some nonprofit 
entities, they are not interested in engaging in money-losing 
activities. And in fact, many privatized (or potentially priva-
tized) activities are either natural monopolies or confer great 
market power on their owners.99 Governments need not—and 
in most cases should not—simply give private investors the 
excess value inherent in these monopoly markets. However, 
there are many ways for governments to extract this value from 
the investors. One option is rate regulation.100 The government 
can require an investor to price the goods or services below 
their market-clearing price, to the benefit of current and future 
users of that good or service. Another option is for governments 
to tax the excess profits earned by the private investor, either 
 
 97. The current health care debate raises questions both about who 
should be responsible for financing health care (individuals or employers 
through private insurers or through the government, either by general reve-
nues or by a government-run or government-subsidized insurance scheme) as 
well as who should provide that care (private enterprises or the government). 
At present, of course, we have a mix of financing schemes and providers. This 
mix may change with the implementation of the recently passed Patient Pro-
tection and Affordable Care Act., Pub. L. No. 111-138, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
However, the implementation of the new Act remains in doubt as the debate 
over health care reform continues to rage. See, e.g., David M. Herszenhorn, 
Senate Rejects Repeal of Health Care Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2011, at A20, 
available at 2011 WLNR 2136789. 
 98. Distributional issues can also be implicated, though if a private enter-
prise is truly more efficient at carrying out the activity, distributional concerns 
could be satisfied by providing government subsidies to allow needy individu-
als to take advantage of the privately provided service. 
 99. See generally C.D. FOSTER, PRIVATIZATION, PUBLIC OWNERSHIP AND 
THE REGULATION OF NATURAL MONOPOLY (1992) (describing the relationship 
between monopoly and privatization). 
 100. See generally Steven J. Horvitz, Rate Regulation and Video Competi-
tion, 674 PRAC. L. INST. 155 (2001) (discussing regulating cable TV rates); 
Claire A. Watkins, Nuclear Power Rate Regulation After Eastern Enterprises: 
Are Ratepayers Being Taken for a Ride?, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 191 
(2000) (discussing legal challenges to monopolistic nuclear power rates). 
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in the form of an explicit tax,101 or through some sort of fee-
splitting arrangement, such as a yearly market access or rental 
fee payable to the government. For example, governments regu-
larly charge concessionaires annual fees for the privilege of 
conducting their businesses on valuable state property, such as 
convention centers, state or national parks, beaches, airports, 
and the like.102 These fees need not merely cover the govern-
ment’s cost in providing the venue, but may be priced to reflect 
the value of the location. Patrons of these businesses certainly 
end up paying high prices for the goods purchased there, but if 
they are residents of the jurisdiction, they may receive a partial 
rebate in the form of lower taxes made possible by the revenues 
collected from these privatized operations.103  
The third option is for the government to collect the 
present value of the future, or expected, profits up front, in the 
form of a one-time sale, franchise, or commission fee. For ex-
ample, in the early days of cable television, cities regularly ex-
tracted franchise fees from cable providers for the unique privi-
lege of operating within their jurisdictions.104 This option, 
unlike the others, leaves future residents paying higher fees 
while providing current residents additional cash (because they 
pay lower taxes) or additional governmental services (pur-
chased with the cash the government received from the private 
enterprises). From a cash-flow perspective, the third option is 
identical to a conventional debt transaction: cash is received up 
front and then repaid through higher charges levied on future 
 
 101. Whether the government could levy an explicit tax would depend on 
the taxing powers granted to the jurisdiction. In theory, though, the govern-
ment could tax away all profits in excess of a normal rate of return. 
 102. See Four T’s, Inc. v. Little Rock Mun. Airport Comm’n, 108 F.3d 909, 
911 (8th Cir. 1997) (ruling on an agreement allowing concession of rental au-
tomobiles at an airport). 
 103. For example, “[e]cotourism generates funds through concession fees 
that can be used to maintain protected areas and parks.” Alexander O’Neill, 
Note, What Globalization Means to Ecotourism, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 
501, 519 (2000). But cf. John Ziegler, Note, The Dangers of Municipal Con-
tracts, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 571, 572 (2011) (describing a poorly managed con-
cession contract that led to very high prices for taxpayers). 
 104. Before enactment of the 1984 Cable Act, “competition among rival 
companies for a de facto monopoly cable franchise” led to high franchise fees in 
some cases. See Robert W. Crandall et al., Does Video Delivered over a Tele-
phone Network Require a Cable Franchise?, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 251, 270 
(2007). This competition all but ended when Congress passed a statute in 1984 
limiting franchise fees to no more than five percent of the cable system’s gross 
revenues. See Cable Communications Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 542(b) (2006); 
Crandall et al., supra, at 270. 
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residents. The only change is in the terminology; in a debt ar-
rangement, the funds are initially provided by the purchasers 
of bonds, who are then repaid with funds raised through taxes 
paid to the government; in the concession arrangement, the ini-
tial funds come from the concessionaires in the form of fees and 
are repaid when their customers pay higher prices for the goods 
and services those concessionaires provide.105 The choice be-
tween regulating rates, splitting ongoing fees, and extracting 
an upfront concession fee implicates the temporal fairness 
question raised earlier.106 Which set of ratepayers is entitled to 
the government’s share of the return: those present at the time 
the concession agreement is entered into or those present as 
the agreement runs its course? On the one hand, it could be ar-
gued that those bearing the financial burden of the higher pric-
es charged by the private operators should be entitled to an off-
set in the form of lower taxes. The net result might be close to 
the situation they would have been in had the government con-
tinued to provide the service at a nonmonopoly price. However, 
if privatization is in fact more efficient, it may be desirable to 
provide “governments” (which is to say current politicians) with 
some incentive to engage in privatization transactions. Provid-
ing their constituents—those present at the time the parties 
execute the agreement—with the government’s share of the 
monopoly price in the form of lower taxes or higher benefits 
would provide such an incentive by making the politicians more 
popular. Providing too much of an incentive, however, risks en-
couraging unwise privatization of governmental functions, pri-
vatizations which provide little or no efficiency advantages 
while burdening future generations of taxpayers with higher 
out-of-pocket costs for the privatized service, or higher govern-
ment taxes or fees or some combination of the two. 
The prospect of unwise privatization, driven by govern-
ments’ need for immediate cash, is hardly academic. In 2008, 
 
 105. There may be a distributional issue as well, since the group of feepay-
ing residents may well be different from the group of taxpaying residents. It is 
hard to know in which direction this distributional issue cuts, however, since 
although it seems unfair to have feepaying residents pay unrelated govern-
mental expenses of nonfeepaying residents, it is also unclear why the feepay-
ing residents should be entitled to receive the good or service provided by the 
privatized entity (or for that matter, the government) at a price less than its 
fair market value. Why is one subsidy fair and the other not?  
 106. See supra text accompanying notes 23–29 (discussing the difficulty of 
determining who should pay for governmental services). As a legal matter, a 
jurisdiction may not have the unfettered right to choose between these alter-
natives, or it may regard the costs of ongoing rate regulation as untenable.  
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the City of Chicago “sold”107 its parking meters to a private 
company, Chicago Parking Meters, LLC. Chicago Parking Me-
ters, denominated the “Concessionaire” in its agreement with 
the City, leased Chicago’s parking meters for a seventy-five 
year period in return for a lump-sum payment of $1.156 bil-
lion.108 Few, if any, of the benefits of the agreement come from 
 
 107. See CHICAGO PARKING METER CONCESSION, supra note 5. Although 
the title of the Agreement (reprinted as “Exhibit B”) denominates it a “Conces-
sion and Lease Agreement,” section 2.6 of the agreement provides that the  
Agreement is intended for United States federal and state income Tax 
purposes to be a sale of the Metered Parking System and the Metered 
Parking System Assets to the Concessionaire and the grant to the 
Concessionaire of a right for and during the Term to collect and retain 
Metered Parking Revenues.  
Id. at 50,563. A possible reason for the much-criticized length of the lease term 
may have been the need to qualify the agreement as a “sale” for tax purposes. 
The Concessionaire needs to “own” the assets covered by the agreement to be-
come entitled to favorable depreciation deductions for tax purposes. See GAO 
REPORT, supra note 4, at 26–27 (describing how ninety-nine and seventy-five 
year lease terms of tollway agreements were required to prove “ownership” for 
tax purposes necessary to claim depreciation deductions over a fifteen-year 
period). The tax benefits provided by those depreciation deductions are an 
integral part of the economics of many privatization deals, such as Chicago’s 
2005 sale of the Skyway, a toll bridge linking Chicago to Gary, Indiana, for 
$1.8 billion. Id. at 21–26 (“[T]he availability of these [depreciation] deductions 
were important incentives to the private sector to enter into some of the high-
way public-private partnerships we reviewed.”); see also Jeffrey N. Buxbaum 
& Iris N. Ortiz, Protecting the Public Interest: The Role of Long-Term Conces-
sion Agreements for Providing Transportation Infrastructure 14 (USC Keston 
Inst., Research Paper No. 07-02, 2007), available at http://www.camsys.com/ 
pubs/Protecting%20the%20Public%20Interest-Report.pdf (“The ability to de-
preciate the ‘value’ of the asset for tax purposes seems to be one of the driving 
factors behind the longer lease terms in the United States.”). Because the only 
physical assets involved in the parking meter deal were the parking meters 
themselves, with an expected useful life of about ten years, the beneficial tax 
results may have been obtainable with a shorter lease term. See OFFICE OF 
THE INSPECTOR GEN., CITY OF CHI., REPORT OF INSPECTOR GENERAL’S 
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE LEASE OF THE CITY’S 
PARKING METERS 19 (2009) [hereinafter INSPECTOR GENERAL’S REPORT], 
available at http://www.chicagoinspectorgeneral.org/pdf/IGO-CMPS-20090602 
.pdf (“[T]he useful life of the parking meters is not likely to exceed 10 years. 
Thus, extending the length of the lease to 75 years was not necessary to allow 
the concessionaire to claim accelerated depreciation and thus increase the size 
of the upfront payment.”). 
 108. INSPECTOR GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 107, at 1. Chicago has been 
a leader of the privatization movement. In addition to the parking meter deal, 
Chicago entered into long-term leases of its municipal parking garages and 
the Skyway. A fourth lease, of Midway Airport, was cancelled when the con-
cessionaire failed to raise the capital necessary to make the agreed-upon up-
front payment. Id. at 12. However, other cities have followed Chicago’s lead. 
Most deals have involved tollways or other transportation infrastructure, see 
id. at 10–12, but other cities have looked into leasing their parking meters and 
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privatization per se; indeed, under the agreement, the Chicago 
Police Department retains primary authority for enforcing the 
parking rules.109 The agreement limits the private company’s 
role to installing and maintaining new meters.110 The Conces-
sionaire later contracted these tasks to a third party for a rela-
tively small sum,111 something the City of Chicago could have 
done.112 In return, the Concessionaire became entitled to all of 
the parking meter revenues for seventy-five years. Obviously, 
 
city-owned parking garages. Joe Smydo, City Looks to Chicago for Privatized 
Parking Ideas, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 14, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 
5354050 (noting that Pittsburgh has paid attention to Chicago’s transactions); 
Dumke, supra note 5 (noting that Pittsburgh, Los Angeles, and Las Vegas 
have followed Chicago’s lead); Leonard Gilroy, Setting the Record Straight on 
Chicago Parking Meter Privatization, REASON FOUND. (Aug. 7, 2009), http:// 
reason.org/news/show/setting-the-record-straight-on-1 (noting that Chicago “is 
already serving as a model for Los Angeles, Indianapolis and other local gov-
ernments contemplating similar deals”).  
 109. See CHICAGO PARKING METER AGREEMENT, supra note 5, at 50,586. 
The Concessionaire does have the right to supplement the City’s enforcement 
efforts. Id. at 50,566. According to a recent newspaper article, the company 
managing the parking meter system on behalf of the Concessionaire is taking 
advantage of that right, having hired “10 ticket writers and plan[ning] to add 
another five this year” despite compliance rates of about seventy-five percent. 
Dan Mihalopoulos & Mick Dumke, Outrage Aside, Drivers Fuel High Parking 
Meter Profits, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2010, at A17, available at 2010 WLNR 
15156453. 
 110. The Concessionaire was a newly formed company, Chicago Parking 
Meters, LLC, created by Morgan Stanley on behalf of some of its investors. 
More than twenty-five percent of the new company is held by the “investment 
arms of the oil-rich Abu Dhabi government,” another substantial chunk be-
longs to the German financial company Allianz, and the remainder is held by 
assorted partnerships. Dan Mihalopoulos, Abu Dhabi Shares Profits from 
Parking Meters, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2009, at A45, available at 2009 WLNR 
24590062. Chicago Parking Meters, LLC, in turn hired LAZ Parking to handle 
the actual operation of the parking meter system, including the replacement of 
coin-operated meters with electronic meters. The transition period did not go 
well, as even LAZ Parking “acknowledged that it did not have enough workers 
to deal with the turnover,” Dan Mihalopoulos, Company Piles Up Profits from 
City’s Parking Meter Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2009, at A29, available at 
2009 WLNR 23426449, leading to a temporary moratorium on parking en-
forcement. However, after a few months, the profits started rolling in. See id.  
 111. To get an idea of the differential, one can look at the Agreement itself. 
Under the terms of the Agreement, the City retained some metered parking 
spaces, denominated Reserve Metered Parking Spaces. Section 7.1 of the 
Agreement provides that fifteen percent of the gross revenues from the Re-
serve Metered Parking Spaces will be paid to the Concessionaire for their “op-
eration and management.” CHICAGO PARKING METER CONCESSION, supra note 
5, at 50,582. Operating costs for the parking meter system as a whole were es-
timated at approximately $4 to $5 million per year. INSPECTOR GENERAL’S 
REPORT, supra note 107, at 16. 
 112. See infra text accompanying notes 116–21.  
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the vast majority of this return will be attributable neither to 
the Concessionaire’s investment in nor its servicing of those 
machines, but to the upfront cash payment accompanying the 
execution of the contract. From an economic perspective, the 
City of Chicago sold seventy-five years’ worth of parking meter 
revenues for the upfront payment of $1.156 billion.113 
Proponents of the parking meter transaction claimed that 
the City could not have raised equivalent revenues from its 
parking system in the absence of the privatization arrangement 
because of political constraints on raising parking fees; essen-
tially, they argued that a private business party can be more 
ruthless in setting prices than governments (or at least the 
Chicago government) could be.114 Though this argument might 
be convincing in some contexts, it is less than plausible in this 
context since the city council could not enter into the contract 
without first passing legislation authorizing the rate increas-
es.115 If it could raise parking rates for purposes of entering into 
the contract, surely it could have raised parking rates for other 
revenue-raising purposes.  
Further, some of the projected revenue is attributable to 
the replacement of the City’s existing parking meters with new 
“pay-and-display” meters. It is unclear how much of that addi-
tional revenue should be attributed to the privatization agree-
ment given that that modernization could have been effected 
without the privatization agreement or with a radically differ-
ent agreement. The cost of purchasing and installing the new 
meters was estimated at $50 million.116 Assuming the City 
wished to pay off that $50 million loan with parking meter 
proceeds, it could have done so with a much shorter “lease” 
 
 113. See INSPECTOR GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 107, at 18. 
 114. See William Blair & Co., Chicago Metered Parking System Transaction 
Summary and Valuation Analysis, CITY OF CHI., 4 (June 30, 2009), http:// 
www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/rev/supp_info/ParkingMeter/Value 
AnalysisByWilliamBlair.pdf [hereinafter Blair, Valuation Analysis] (describ-
ing the assumption of annual parking rate increases of three percent as “prob-
ably aggressive given the fact that the rates on 75% City meters [sic] had not 
increased in over 20 years” despite a “rate of inflation average [of ] approx-
imately 3.2% per year”). For a more complete discussion of the argument and 
its application to the Chicago parking meter deal, see infra note 129.  
 115. See Authorization for Execution of Concession and Lease Agreement 
and Amendment of Titles 2, 3, 9 and 10 of Municipal Code of Chicago in Con-
nection with Chicago Metered Parking System, 12-4-08 Coun. J. 50506, § 10 
(2008) (codified as amended at Chicago, Ill., Mun. Code tit. 9, ch. 64, § 205 
(2008 & Supp. 2010)). 
 116. See INSPECTOR GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 107, at 15.  
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term, or even a lease term running until the $50 million and 
some stated interest amount was repaid. Essentially, the City 
used a $50 million upgrade of its parking meter system as cam-
ouflage for a much larger loan. 
Economically, then, the parking meter transaction is best 
described as a loan transaction: the City of Chicago borrowed 
$1.156 billion,117 but rather than pay interest on the debt at a 
set rate, it agreed to pay a contingent rate of interest both 
measured and secured by seventy-five years of parking meter 
revenues.118 When characterized this way, the transaction is a 
variant of special funds indebtedness, the type of indebtedness 
that in some jurisdictions, including Illinois,119 escapes consti-
tutional restrictions on debt.120 Further, it is the more ques-
tionable variant of special-funds indebtedness, because most of 
the parking meter revenues that will be used to pay back the 
debt are not revenues that will exist only because the Conces-
sion Agreement was entered into or to compensate for the costs 
of running the parking meter system. The City of Chicago could 
have generated most of the revenue alienated under the con-
tract by raising parking meter rates and replaced its parking 
meters with pay-and-display meters, without entering into a 
$1.156 billion contract.121 
Thus, the agreement exchanges future public revenues for 
present public funds, just like debt. And just like many debt ar-
rangements, the parking meter deal will leave future ratepay-
ers decidedly worse off. The City’s expenses going forward will 
not change (except for the relatively modest cost of installing 
and servicing the parking meters), but it and its ratepayers will 
have to come up with a new source of revenue to fund those on-
going expenses. Future ratepayers will be doubly disfavored 
relative to current residents: they will have to pay higher taxes 
 
 117. Actually, the debt incurred by Chicago was about $50 million larger 
than the $1.156 billion payment received by the City because the Concession-
aire bore the cost of purchasing and installing the new parking meters. See 
Blair, Valuation Analysis, supra note 114, at 4. 
 118. See GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 20 (listing “avoid[ing] the legisla-
tive or administrative limits that governed the amount of outstanding debt 
these states were allowed to have” as an “advantage[ ] for the states” of using 
highway public-private partnership agreements). 
 119. See People ex rel. City of Salem v. McMackin, 291 N.E.2d 807, 816 (Ill. 
1972) (“In each of these cases we have held that when the obligation is to be 
paid solely from the income derived from the property purchased by the use of 
the bonds, no municipal indebtedness is incurred.”). 
 120. See supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text. 
 121. See INSPECTOR GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 107, at 16–17. 
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to maintain the same level of services, even as their disposable 
income is reduced by the extra parking fees mandated by the 
agreement.  
In some respects, Chicago’s sale/lease of its parking meter 
revenues is no different from its sale or lease of any other piece 
of valuable governmental property that could be retained and 
rented out. It is hardly unusual for governments to dispose of 
unwanted or surplus property ranging from old police cars to 
unwanted office buildings, rather than keeping the property 
and trying to use it to generate income.122 Generally, the sort of 
privatization that motivates government to sell used vehicles 
rather than trying to engage in proprietary endeavors is 
lauded; the accepted wisdom is that governments will be worse 
at selling used cars at the retail level or renting them out than 
would the private sector. It would seem foolish to say that gov-
ernments should be forbidden from ever disposing of property 
once acquired, even though the sums received from such sales 
could be traced to past tax contributions, and the future income 
foregone to future taxable years. Perhaps this is because most 
of these sales are recurring situations and in these recurring 
sale situations, the government’s current expenditures on re-
placement cars and office buildings and schools likely exceed 
the amounts they receive from the sale of the older models. 
Such current acquisitions compensate future taxpayers for the 
losses they suffer from the alienation of the old property. They 
are not really being left worse off. Perhaps this is because the 
property being disposed of is viewed as truly surplus, not some-
thing of continuing financial interest to the city or its inhabi-
tants. Perhaps the prospect of politicians spending the capital 
accumulated by former generations is sufficiently common to be 
beyond objection. Perhaps the sums involved are relatively triv-
ial in the context of the entire governmental budget.  
These arguments, however, cannot be made to support the 
City of Chicago’s parking meter deal. The politicians disposed 
of future revenues belonging to future residents (residents, it is 
worth noting, who will receive little if any recompense in the 
form of improved parking), not past, built-up capital which in 
some sense belonged to current (or past) residents. The use of 
 
 122. See, e.g., Illinois Opens Online Bidding for Surplus Property, CHI. 
DEFENDER ONLINE (Aug. 16, 2010), http://www.chicagodefender.com/article 
-8510-illinois-opens-online-bidding-for-surplus-property.html (discussing the 
wide variety of city and state property auctioned to the public by the State of 
Illinois). 
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the disposed-of property will not change, it will continue to be 
used by the same individuals for the same purpose, and there is 
no sense in which the parking spaces are surplus. Further, 
these politicians, for the most part, used the revenues alienated 
from future years to pay current expenses, which, in an ideal 
world, would have been paid out of the pockets (and taxes) of 
current residents,123 and not to purchase replacement assets 
that would benefit future residents. Moreover, the sum in-
volved is huge.  
Most importantly, the possibilities for extension of the con-
cept to other portions of the state and local revenue bases are 
obvious. The former mayor of Chicago was eyeing the public 
water system.124 But every fee-based, or potentially fee-based, 
government service may be the target of a similar privatization 
arrangement. Governments can apply the arguments that were 
made to support parking meter privatization—that private 
businesses can carry out (some portion) of the activities as well 
as government, and that selling the right to engage in the ac-
tivity for an upfront fee removes the government’s risk that 
fees will fail to grow over time due to government timidity 
about raising rates or declines in interest in the activity125—to 
hunting fees, vehicle registration programs, sewage treatment 
facilities, and fire protection, for example, in order to collect the 
present value of these future fees in advance. Further, the 
smaller the operational responsibilities devolved on the private 
investor relative to the revenue expected from the activity, the 
 
 123. The City planned to put $400 million of the $1.156 billion in a “long-
term reserve/revenue replacement fund,” $100 million in a “human infrastruc-
ture fund,” $325 million “in a mid-term budget relief fund to help balance our 
budgets through 2012,” and $320 million “in a budget stabilization fund that 
may be used to help bridge the period until the nation’s economy begins to 
grow again,” while using $150 million “to balance the 2009 budget.” Chicago 
Parking Meter Facts, CITY CHI., http://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/ 
depts/rev/supp_info/ParkingMeter/ParkinMeterBrochure.pdf (last visited Apr. 
24, 2011). Splitting the numbers up this way makes it only slightly harder to 
discern that of the $1.156 billion received, the City expected to spend fully 
$795 million within three or four years of entering into the contract. In fact, 
the City spent almost $400 million from the parking meter deal in 2009, and 
expects to spend another $600 million in 2010. See Dan Mihalopoulos & Hal 
Dardick, Daley Steers Clear of More Layoffs, Taxes, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 22, 2009, 
at A1, available at 2009 WLNR 20922022.  
 124. See Mihalopoulos & Dardick, supra note 123, at A1 (“[Mayor Daley] 
did not discount the possibility of privatizing the city’s water system, an ap-
proach that Milwaukee officials recently considered.”). 
 125. See Blair, Valuation Analysis, supra note 114, at 4–5 (calling rate and 
utilization “challenges and risks” that the transaction “shifted . . . to the con-
cessionaire” under the agreement). 
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larger the upfront payment to the government, and the larger 
the net burden placed on future ratepayers.126 The arguments 
made in favor of the parking meter transaction—that it raised 
more money for the City than it would have been able to raise 
had it kept the meters because it transferred the risk that fu-
ture revenues will fall127 and that the City never would have 
been able to raise parking rates to the levels called for under 
the agreement128—apply not only to other types of fees but also 
to taxes such as real estate turnover taxes, sales taxes, and the 
like.129 In short, the rationale would stretch to cover the sale of 
any portion (or indeed the entirety) of a jurisdiction’s future tax 
revenues.130 
The history of constitutional and statutory limitations of 
governmental debt is one of avoidance and noncompliance, 
 
 126. Cf. GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 34 (cautioning that public receipt of 
greater present-day benefits from public-private partnerships are more likely 
to burden future taxpayers). 
 127. See Blair, Valuation Analysis, supra note 114, at 10 (“The City will 
also benefit from a risk transfer, as the investment returns on the revenue re-
placement fund will be less volatile and more certain than the cash flow pro-
duced by the System.”). As the recent recession has amply demonstrated, tax 
revenues can fall rather than increase. 
 128. See id. at 4 (outlining “two significant challenges to increasing parking 
meter rates,” one of which was the City’s failure to increase rates in the past). 
 129. The “risk” alluded to in the Blair report is the risk that parking reve-
nues will fall as parking rates rise as a result of “the reaction of parkers 
. . . during the initial five years of rate increases.” Id. at 5. Similar risks of 
avoidance (or evasion) arise when any fee or tax rises. See INSPECTOR 
GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 107, at 4 (“Specifically, the City has argued 
that (a) it would have been impossible for the City to have both kept the park-
ing-meter system and raised the rates to the same extent as the lease, because 
there was not sufficient political will to do so . . . .”). Somehow, the mayor and 
city council found the “political will” to approve a contract that mandated ex-
actly those rate hikes, and have stood fast against all attempts to undo or 
change the hikes. See id. at 5 (“In brief, the ‘impossibility argument’ is disprov-
en by (among other things) the fact that the City did in fact raise the rates 
when it approved the lease, and the fact that other cities have kept their park-
ing-meter systems and passed large rate increases.”). 
 130. See supra text accompanying note 11 (discussing the practice of “tax 
farming”). The IRS experimented with outsourcing its debt collection activities 
beginning in 2006, though it paid its contractors a percentage of collections 
rather than accepting an up-front fee. See David Cay Johnston, IRS Enlists 
Outside Help in Collecting Delinquent Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2006, at 
A12 (announcing award of contracts); Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., 
IRS Selects Three Firms to Take Part in Delinquent Tax Collection Effort 
(Mar. 9, 2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=155069,00 
.html (same). The program was terminated in 2009 after the IRS determined 
it was more efficient to use in-house workers. See Stephen Ohlemacher, IRS 
Collecting Own Debts, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 7, 2009, at A4. 
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aided and abetted by courts and state legislatures.131 The cur-
rent absence of controls on privatization fits that pattern, and 
may be seen as innocuous for that reason. However, as Part III 
of this Article argues, privatization is a uniquely dangerous 
technique for avoiding debt limitations because the problems it 
creates extend beyond merely creating excessive debt.  
III.  THE COLLATERAL DAMAGE OF PRIVATIZATION   
As detailed above, although most state constitutions limit 
the ability of state and local governments to incur debt, a num-
ber of devices have evolved to help these governments undercut 
the limitations. Governments do not always take advantage of 
these avoidance devices.132 Referenda on debt issuances remain 
a staple of political life, for example, and, in most cases, politi-
cians adhere to the outcomes of those referenda.133 Some sus-
pect that politicians use these escape mechanisms strategically, 
to finance those projects that do not have the support of the 
public but that the politicians are nonetheless interested in 
pursuing.134 Even independent of this agency problem,135 
though, are the extra costs involved in taking advantage of 
these mechanisms. All of them involve some additional costs 
(although those costs must be compared to the costs of holding 
 
 131. See supra Part II.A–E. 
 132. They may take advantage of them more than most people realize, 
however. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 17, at 709 (“In recent dec-
ades, however, nonguaranteed debt [that is exempt from debt limitations] has 
become the principal form of state and local borrowing. In 2000, 73% of state 
long-term debt outstanding consisted of nonguaranteed debt. . . . 59% of mu-
nicipal and township long-term debt . . . consisted of nonguaranteed debt.”); 
Gillette, Democracy and Debt, supra note 42, at 379 (“In a recent New Jersey 
case challenging the state’s use of alternative financing mechanisms, one of 
the judges noted that the state had outstanding $3.5 billion of general obliga-
tion debt that typically requires a bond election, while it had outstanding 
$10.8 billion of a different form of debt that required none.” (citing Lonegan v. 
State, 809 A.2d 91, 128–29 (N.J. 2002))). 
 133. But not always. See Gillette, Democracy and Debt, supra note 42, at 
375–76 (“Nevertheless, in recent years, there have been multiple instances in 
which the local electorate has rejected proposed bond issues, only to have local 
officials finance the same project through an alternative mechanism not sub-
ject to the bond election requirement.”). 
 134. See id. 
 135. Whether to construe politicians’ pursuit of personal agendas as an 
agency problem depends on one’s view of what underlies that personal agenda: 
Is it a desire for personal or political gain, or a sincere belief that the electo-
rate is deceived about its self interest and would be made better off if the poli-
ticians’ wishes prevailed? Only the first is an agency problem; the second is 
arguably what politicians are elected to do.  
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a referendum), but privatization has more than the others. In 
particular, privatization deals raise serious pricing issues.136 
Further, privatization restricts future government decision-
making more than some of the other debt avoidance devices. 
Additionally, it is particularly nontransparent, leading to a loss 
of political control over its misuse. 
A. CASH PRICING 
In traditional municipal debt transactions, pricing is rela-
tively simple and relatively free from opportunities for corrup-
tion.137 From a financing perspective, the only issue is the ap-
propriate interest rate given the length of the financing 
contract and the riskiness of the debtor. Even if the debt is in-
itially sold to an intermediary, an investment bank, for exam-
ple, for resale to investors, the accuracy of the price at which it 
was sold to the intermediary can be determined by checking it 
against the price the intermediary received on resale; discrep-
ancies can be identified and punished, either under the securi-
ties laws or by the debtor’s decision to use another interme-
diary in future transactions.138 Additionally, when debt is 
divided into small chunks and sold on relatively large, estab-
lished, and open public markets, price collusion is hard to sus-
 
 136. See GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 33 (cautioning that in exchanging 
future revenues for immediate cash, “the public sector may give up more than 
it receives in a concession payment”). 
 137. No market is free from abuse possibilities. In 2004, municipal bond 
dealers engaged in refinancings of municipal debt were found to have cheated 
the federal government by inflating the cost of Treasury bills being sold to 
municipal governments. See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Settles 
with Ten Brokerage Firms as Part of Global Resolution of Yield Burning 
Claims (Apr. 6, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2000-45.txt; 
Issue Brief: Yield Burning, GOV’T FIN. OFFICERS ASS’N (Jan. 2008), http://gfoa 
.org/downloads/yieldburning.pdf. More recently, federal agencies have been 
investigating allegations that financial intermediaries colluded to set unrea-
sonably high fees for underwriting municipal bonds or derivatives based on 
the bonds, sometimes paying kickbacks to public officials to direct the deals 
(and the fees) their way. See Mary Williams Walsh, Nationwide Inquiry on 
Bids for Municipal Bonds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2009, at A1, available at 2009 
WLNR 441316. For a description of an earlier incarnation of this scheme and 
attempts to combat it, see generally Jon B. Jordan, The Regulation of “Pay to 
Play” and the Influence of Political Contributions in the Municipal Securities 
Industry, 1999 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 489. All of these scandals involve alleged 
malfeasance by intermediaries rather than mispricing of the underlying secur-
ities. There is no reason to believe that the intermediaries involved in putting 
together privatization deals are more or less corrupt than those involved in the 
municipal bond market; indeed, they may be the same institutions and people. 
 138. See supra note 137 (discussing exposure of yield-burning schemes). 
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tain because of the financial incentives for individual market 
participants to cheat an attempted cartel.139  
The story is similar for somewhat less traditional munici-
pal debt transactions such as special-funds debt, whether the 
debt is backed by proceeds from contracts with private enter-
prises (i.e., industrial revenue bonds) or fees generated by pub-
lic projects such as tollways, airports, or power facilities.140 Me-
chanically, the procedures for issuing such debt remain the 
same. Ultimately, the price of the debt is set in a relatively 
thick public market.141 Public investors must weigh the riski-
ness of the underlying project. Indeed, the market check pro-
vided by investors who investigate the creditworthiness of a 
project before making their investment is typically identified as 
one of the benefits of using special funds rather than full faith 
and credit debt.142 When knowledgeable investors refuse to buy 
 
 139. See George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligarchy, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44, 44 
(1964) (positing that secret price cutting by cartel members may undermine 
attempts at price collusion). 
 140. The move toward the use of special funds (rather than general obliga-
tion) debt has been criticized for some of the same reasons this Article argues 
against debt masquerading as privatization: the added costs of complexity and 
the restraints on future policymaking. See RICHARD BRIFFAULT, BALANCING 
ACTS: THE REALITY BEHIND STATE BALANCED BUDGET REQUIREMENTS 45–47 
(1996).  
 141. Of course, markets are only as good as the underlying information on 
which they are based, and criticism has long been leveled at the rating agen-
cies providing information to the bond markets. See, e.g., John Patrick Hunt, 
Credit Rating Agencies and the “Worldwide Credit Crisis”: The Limits of Repu-
tation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and a Proposal for Improvement, 2009 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 109, 114 (criticizing rating agencies’ rating of novel fi-
nancial instruments); Joel Seligman, The Municipal Disclosure Debate, 9 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 647, 658 (1984) (“One critic went so far as to argue that in light of 
the number of municipal bonds and the number of rating analysts, the average 
bond rating should take only twenty seconds.”); Francis A. Bottini, Jr., Com-
ment, An Examination of the Current Status of Rating Agencies and Proposals 
for Limited Oversight of Such Agencies, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 579, 579 (1993) 
(“An analysis of the current market for ratings of both financial securities and 
insurance companies reveals significant problems with rating agencies, such 
as lethargy in changing ratings, political influence, unsolicited ratings, and 
inaccurate ratings.”). Some believe that the current municipal bond market is 
overvalued. See Page Perry LLC, Risks Grow in the Municipal Bond Markets, 
INVESTMENT FRAUD LAW. BLOG (June 17, 2010), http://www.investment 
fraudlawyerblog.com/2010/06/risks_grow_in_the_municipal_bo.html (noting con-
troversy over current safety of municipal bond investments). However, despite 
the market’s problems, large numbers of investors routinely invest significant 
amounts of money in municipal bonds, indicating their belief that the prices 
set in the market are reasonably accurate. 
 142. Investors are supposed to serve as a check on profligate or unwise in-
vestments by refusing to purchase bonds in projects that are unlikely to gen-
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bonds, other investors also become suspicious that they will not 
be paid in accordance with their terms or are otherwise unde-
sirable and also stay away from them; in the absence of buyers, 
the sale of the bonds will fail to raise enough money to under-
take undesirable projects. However, even sophisticated bond 
buyers care only about downside risks: Will the project gener-
ate enough cash to pay off the debt in accordance with its 
terms? They have no share in, and therefore no interest in ana-
lyzing, the extent of potential gains above that minimum re-
turn. 
By contrast, one of the most contentious issues in many 
privatization deals is the ultimate contract price.143 Price be-
comes an issue precisely because the privatization deals are 
more complex and the privatization markets less thick and less 
transparent than the regular municipal bond market.144 These 
characteristics of privatization markets provide room for mis-
behavior and mistakes. Further, suspicion abounds.145 The ab-
sence of clarity and transparency makes for the appearance, if 
not the reality, of improper behavior. 
Privatization deals are more complex than municipal bond 
deals because investors are interested not just in downside 
 
erate the cash flow necessary to pay them off. See Gillette, supra note 30, at 
1259–60 (explaining the disciplining function of the market for municipal debt). 
 143. E.g., infra note 145. 
 144. Cf. Ellen Dannin, To Market, To Market: Legislating on Privatization 
and Subcontracting, 60 MD. L. REV. 249, 268–69 (2001) (discussing the diffi-
culty of pricing privatization deals given the unique circumstances of each). 
 145. The economics behind Chicago’s parking meter deal remain controver-
sial. The report issued by the City’s inspector general concluded that the in-
vestors grossly underpaid the City. See INSPECTOR GENERAL’S REPORT, supra 
note 107, at 3 (arguing that “the parking-meter lease was a dubious financial 
deal for the City”); Mihalopoulos, supra note 110 at A29. The designer of the 
deal disagreed. See Blair, Valuation Analysis, supra note 114, at 2 (“Our anal-
ysis confirms that by properly projecting System revenues and by applying a 
discount rate that appropriately reflects the relative risks of the System, the 
conclusion that the City received full and fair value for the Concession of the 
System is clearly supported and affirmed.”). Suspicions have been raised about 
Blair’s independence and objectivity. See Connie Wilson, Chicago Residents 
Outraged over Mayor’s Sale of Chicago Parking Meters and Lots, ASSOCIATED 
CONTENT, June 21, 2009, available at http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/ 
1866529/chicago_residents_outraged_over_mayors_sale (noting the substantial 
fee William Blair received for effectuating the deal, his contributions to the 
mayor’s wife’s favorite charity, and other personal linkages); see also Ben Jo-
ravsky & Mick Dumke, FAIL, Part Two: One BILLION Dollars! New Evidence 
Suggests Chicago Leased Out Its Parking Meters for a Fraction of What They’re 
Worth, CHI. READER (May 21, 2009), http://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/ 
one-billion-dollars/Content?oid=1123046.  
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risks, but also upside possibilities.146 When an activity is priva-
tized, the buyers become entitled to all of the revenue generat-
ed by the privatized activity; their interest is not capped as it is 
under most debt deals. From a risk perspective, the difference 
between the two types of transactions is the same as the differ-
ence between selling and buying stocks rather than bonds. This 
is not just a question of whether an equity cushion exists; it is 
also a question of variance. More specifically, the range of pro-
jected revenue streams may be large, leading to substantially 
different value estimates.147 For example, the amount of reve-
nue generated from a tollway depends on its usage, which, in 
turn, depends on the state of the economy, the development (or 
not) of transportation alternatives, and regional development 
patterns.148 High gasoline prices or health concerns may en-
 
 146. See GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 26 (“[P]rivate investment groups 
. . . have recently demonstrated an increasing interest in investing in public 
infrastructure. They see the sector as representing long-term assets with sta-
ble, potentially high yield returns.”). 
 147. While Blair defended the sale price of $1.156 billion for Chicago’s 
parking meters, see Blair, Valuation Analysis, supra note 114, at 1, the Inspec-
tor General thought that the City “was paid, conservatively, $974 million less 
for this 75-year lease than the City would have received from 75 years of park-
ing-meter revenue,” INSPECTOR GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 107, at 2. Sev-
eral years earlier, when Chicago leased its interest in the Skyway, linking 
Chicago to the Indiana Tollway, the winning bid was $1.82 billion, more than 
double the second-highest bid and substantially above Chicago’s prebid esti-
mate of its value. See Craig L. Johnson et al., Toll Road Privatization Transac-
tions: The Chicago Skyway and Indiana Toll Road, CARL VINSON INST. GOV’T, 
3–4 (Sept. 2007), http://www.cviog.uga.edu/services/research/abfm/johnson.pdf 
(reporting bids of $505 million, $700.5 million, and $1.82 billion). Though most 
rejoiced at the high price, some believed that even the winning Skyway bid 
was too low. See id. at 10 (“[F]rom a longer-term financial perspective, it is dif-
ficult to know whether the Skyway privatization was a good deal for the 
City.”); see also INSPECTOR GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 107, at 9 (“[S]ome 
criticized the deal as raising toll rates too aggressively and arguing that the 
City did not receive a large enough payment.”). Nor are discordant valuations 
limited to transactions involving Chicago. The winning bid for the Indiana Toll 
Road was $3.8 billion. While the consulting firm hired by the state deemed its 
value to be slightly under $2 billion, a study performed by an economics pro-
fessor on behalf of opponents of the concession estimated the value at about 
$11 billion. See GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 33. The point is not (necessari-
ly) that the governments granting concessions received too little, but simply 
that the valuation issues are extremely difficult, leading to widely disparate 
estimates of a “fair” price for these transactions. See id. at 33 (explaining how 
“toll rate assumptions can influence asset valuations and, therefore expected 
concession payments”). In turn, this makes it difficult to enforce (either as a 
criminal or political matter) ethical and competency norms.  
 148. See GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 34 (“[U]nforeseen circumstances 
can dramatically alter the relative value of future revenues compared with the 
market value of the [tollway] facility.”). 
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courage transportation substitutes, reducing parking meter 
usage. Different people reasonably may disagree over the like-
lihood of particular risks occurring, leading to differing valua-
tion estimates.149  
Further, because many of the risks inherent in privatiza-
tion deals may be allocated through negotiated contractual 
terms, the amount of risk accepted by investors varies from 
contract to contract. For example, the contractual parties may 
split positive returns through a profit-sharing arrangement 
triggered when revenues exceed a preset floor amount.150 Simi-
larly, parties may share negative returns through a mirror im-
age of such an arrangement, where some portion of the agreed 
upon compensation is forfeited if revenues derived from the 
property covered by contract fall below a certain level. Con-
tracts may provide that its signatories are forbidden from en-
gaging in activities likely to encourage drops in demand—or 
from engaging in activities that will artificially discourage such 
demand reduction.151 For example, a tollway privatization 
agreement may provide that the government may not construct 
a competing roadway within a twenty mile radius of the road 
that is being privatized. Indeed, parties may manipulate con-
tract terms so that a transaction denominated as a sale eco-
nomically replicates a conventional debt transaction by narrow-
ly limiting the investor’s upside returns and downside losses to 
a range consistent with the returns offered by conventional 
debt. Presumably, however, doing so would risk the agree-
ment’s recharacterization as a debt for tax purposes, undermin-
ing some of the deal’s tax benefits. Even worse, it may be re-
characterized for state law purposes, making it subject to any 
applicable constitutional and statutory debt limitations.  
Although negotiating risk allocations offers advantages to 
the contracting parties, the variation across contracts152 in risk 
 
 149. See Buxbaum & Ortiz, supra note 107, at 4 (“The experts disagree on 
the true costs and benefits of these deals. . . . [M]uch of the information pro-
moting long-term concessions comes from those who will benefit directly—the 
construction companies, toll operators, bankers, attorneys, and their consul-
tants. Similarly, opposition comes from those with a vested interest . . . .”). 
 150. See Pagano, supra note 4, at 383 (describing Florida’s requirement 
that all concession agreements contain a revenue sharing component); Bux-
baum & Ortiz, supra note 107, at 40. 
 151. See CHICAGO PARKING METER CONCESSION, supra note 5, at 50,573 
(limiting the right of the City to construct competing off-street parking lots); 
Buxbaum & Ortiz, supra note 107, at 42 (describing noncompete clauses in 
tollway deals). 
 152. It is worth noting that later parking meter leases were configured 
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allocations makes it harder to discern the fair market value of 
what parties are giving up or the adequacy of what parties are 
receiving in return under any particular contract. The more 
risk variations there are, the fewer in number the similar 
transactions, and the less trustworthy any market compar-
ables. The harder it is for outside observers to penetrate the 
pricing decisions, to determine if they are fair to the locality, 
the harder it is to tell if the localities’ agents, the politicians 
and bureaucrats, have done a good or bad job of negotiating the 
contract. Political checks cannot work in the absence of infor-
mation about the right price for privatization deals; without 
such information, citizens do not know whether they should be 
lauding or punishing the politicians responsible for such deals.  
This lack of pricing transparency is accentuated by the fact 
that the privatization market is much thinner than the market 
for publicly traded stocks and bonds. Stocks and bonds 
represent relatively small chunks of larger enterprises. The 
value of these small chunks is low enough to appeal to large 
numbers of independent investors who serve as checks against 
mispricing.153 Privatization deals are much more similar in size 
to sales of entire businesses. Because of the scale of these 
transactions, relatively few potential buyers exist for any par-
ticular deal. This leaves opportunities for collusion or simple 
underpricing at the expense of the selling entity. In Chicago’s 
parking meter deal, for example, only two bidders vied for the 
project.154 Although one can certainly claim that there was a 
fair public auction of the Chicago parking meter system in that 
anyone could have entered the auction, the paucity of bidders 
can also be regarded as a symptom of a defective market, one 
susceptible to control by insiders or other elites and simply too 
thin to be trustworthy.155 Even in the absence of a history of 
 
quite differently than Chicago’s. See Darrell Preston, Morgan Stanley Chicago 
Parking Makes Cities Redo Deals, BLOOMBERG.COM, Nov. 15, 2010, http://www 
.bloomberg.com/news/print/2010-11-15/morgan-stanley-chicago-parking-windfall 
-makes-cities-redo-deals.html (comparing Indianapolis, which “would rather 
take less money up front in favor of more total fees” and “exit clauses that let 
the city end the lease,” to “Los Angeles, which may get a larger initial pay-
ment by giving up control over rates”).  
 153. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 154. See INSPECTOR GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 107, at 13 (describing 
how ten bidders responded to the RFQ for the parking meter deal, of which 
eight were qualified, but only two made actual bids).  
 155. Again, this does not mean that the governments entering into these 
deals necessarily lose out; they may benefit from the “winner’s curse,” which 
suggests that the highest bid in an auction is likely to be too high. See 
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corruption and sweetheart deals (that is, involving some city 
other than Chicago), suspicions of malfeasance are likely to 
arise under these circumstances; moreover, they would be diffi-
cult to disprove. Other privatization auctions also involved rel-
atively few bidders.156 
 
RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF 
ECONOMIC LIFE 50–51 (1992) (explaining the winner’s curse). There is, howev-
er, no way of knowing when, or if, the winner’s curse will occur, though it is 
less likely to occur when there are few bidders. See Clayton P. Gillette, Busi-
ness Incentives, Interstate Competition, and the Commerce Clause, 82 MINN. L. 
REV. 447, 455–56 (1997) (detailing circumstances making the winner’s curse 
less likely). But see PHINEAS BAXANDALL ET AL., U.S. PUB. INTEREST 
RESEARCH GRP. EDUC. FUND, PRIVATE ROADS, PUBLIC COSTS 23 (2009), avail-
able at http://cdn.publicinterestnetwork.org/assets/rXyTdCxiacJTXJi3Cm-W1w/ 
Private-Roads-Public-Costs-Updated.pdf (noting that one investor had to write 
down the value of its tollway investments in late 2008). The underlying ques-
tion is what purpose is served by putting future ratepayers at the mercy of 
this sort of valuation lottery. 
 156. See Buxbaum & Ortiz, supra note 107, at 14, 16 (noting that five pro-
posers were selected to submit detailed bids for the Chicago Skyway conces-
sion and four bids were submitted for the Indiana Toll Road). There has been 
considerable discussion about the growth of competition and consequent drop 
in investor yields. See Yvette Shields, Illinois Holds Hearing on Leasing Toll 
Road, BOND BUYER, June 1, 2006, at 1, 53 (“[A] widening pool of potential bid-
ders could help increase competition and prices. While initially some bidders 
sought high rates of return on their investment in the area of 12%, those fig-
ures have dropped in some cases to 7% to 9% . . . .”); Emily Thornton, Roads to 
Riches: Why Investors Are Clamoring to Take over America’s Highways, 
Bridges, and Airports—And Why the Public Should Be Nervous, BUS. WK., 
May 7, 2007, at 50, 52, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/ 
content/07_19/b4033001.htm (“Now a slew of Wall Street firms . . . [are] piling 
into infrastructure . . . . Rob Collins, head of infrastructure mergers and ac-
quisitions at Morgan Stanley, estimates that 30 funds are being raised around 
the world . . . .”). Despite this discussion, there has been little indication of ef-
ficacious competition in actual deals. In Spain, a leader in the privatization of 
tollways, “two private companies dominate the industry—accounting for 70% 
of the country’s tolled traffic.” Jessica Hurtado, For Whom the Road Tolls: A 
Two-Year Moratorium on Highway Privatization in Texas, 41 TEX. TECH L. 
REV. 653, 657 (2009). Projected rates of return from privatization projects in 
the United States remain high. See Blair, Valuation Analysis, supra note 114, 
at 7–8 (justifying the pricing of the Chicago deal at ten to fourteen percent 
rate of return). It is worth noting that in concluding that the contract price fell 
within these parameters, Blair assumed that the investor would have to re-
place the parking meters several times over the course of the lease, at sub-
stantial expense. See id. at 6. Whether these expenditures actually will be nec-
essary, or whether technological advances during the term of the contract will 
make them unnecessary, is far from clear; it is plausible that parking fees may 
be paid through cell phone transfers in the not very distant future, eliminating 
the need for expensive meters. See Parking Fee Paid via Mobile Phone, 
ECOMMERCE J. (Aug. 15, 2008, 4:46 AM), http://ecommercejournal.com/news/ 
parking_fee_paid_via_mobile_phone (describing a pilot program in England). 
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Pricing problems are not unique to the privatization con-
text.157 Defense contracting provides a close parallel. When the 
federal government wants to build a new fighter jet or other 
weapons system, great concern is always expressed about the 
small number of potential bidders, the opportunities for collu-
sive bidding, and the quality of the final product.158 The federal 
government sometimes goes to great lengths to ensure the con-
tinued existence of multiple competitors due to fears about the 
pricing power of a contractor with a de facto monopoly.159 The 
use of cutting-edge—and sometimes even beyond cutting-
edge—technology reduces the utility of market checks on pric-
ing because often there is only one possible provider of the 
technology. Over time, the federal government has experi-
mented with a number of defense contract formulations—from 
cost-plus contracting, where the government promises to reim-
burse the purveyors’ costs with a guaranteed profit margin, to 
flat-price contracts, where the government sets the price in ad-
vance, to incentive pricing, where the government reduces 
 
The investors will reap an even higher rate of return if future meter expendi-
tures are avoided or reduced.  
 157. Indeed, one might worry that forcing governments to use conventional 
debt rather than privatization agreements will simply shift losses from cor-
ruption or incompetence to other contractual arrangements, such as service, 
construction, or purchase contracts entered into contemporaneously with the 
privatization agreements. However, those opportunities for misbehavior would 
exist—and likely be exploited to the extent possible—independently of any ad-
vantages gained under a debt or privatization contract. One can at least hope 
that reducing the number of opportunities for misbehavior will reduce its extent. 
 158. See HOUSE ARMED SERVS. COMM. PANEL ON DEF. ACQUISITION 
REFORM, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 9 (2010), available at http://www 
.ndia.org/Advocacy/LegislativeandFederalIssuesUpdate/Documents/March2010/ 
Defense_Acquisition_Reform_Panel_Final_Report_3-23-2010.pdf (“The length 
and scope of weapon system programs has accelerated defense industry’s con-
solidation around a handful of aerospace firms that now control large amounts 
of production capacity . . . . The Panel is concerned that the end result of this 
process is the gradual erosion of competition and innovation in the defense in-
dustrial base.”). 
 159. See Joint Strike Fighter: Strong Risk Management Essential as Program 
Enters Most Challenging Phase, Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Air and 
Land Forces of the H. Comm. on Armed Servs., 111th Cong. 5 (2009) (state-
ment of Michael Sullivan, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09711t.pdf (defending continuing 
development of an alternate engine for the Joint Strike Fighter program be-
cause “[r]esults from past competitions provide evidence of potential financial 
and nonfinancial savings”); Nathan Hodge, Navy Weighs Ship’s Design, Along 
with Its Own Future, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2010, at A2 (noting that the Navy 
will order ten warships from one shipyard and five from a competing shipyard). 
  
2010 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:1965 
 
payments when costs exceed a certain level—only to find that 
there is no perfect structural solution.160  
Accordingly, it seems odd at best, and perverse at worst, 
for cities and states to do the opposite: to reduce the fairly ro-
bust price competition in two preexisting markets—debt mar-
kets161 and the markets for providing services—by bundling 
transactions into packages very few organizations are interest-
ed in bidding on, and for which the pricing is less transparent. 
Although such arrangements reduce “risk” by monetizing what 
is otherwise an uncertain income stream, the associated pricing 
problems create substantial, offsetting risks of underpayment 
and outright corruption. In the absence of pricing transparency, 
the political system is poorly placed to police against these 
risks, and no other effective controls exist.  
Pricing problems, and the difficulties of policing prices, are 
not the only problems associated with the use of privatization 
deals as a way of borrowing money. A second problem is that 
the terms of these deals often lock the affected jurisdiction into 
questionable long-term policies. These lock-ins, as described in 
the next section, are necessary to safeguard the huge upfront 
investments made by the private buyers, investments equaling 
the present value of future taxes foregone. But they are hardly 
benign. 
B. NONCASH CONTRACTUAL TERMS 
Private investors are not altruists; they enter into privati-
zation deals to make money. And because that money must 
come from the revenues derived from the privatized enterprise, 
those profits depend on the success of the enterprise they are 
purchasing (leasing). The government can, and often must, 
commit itself to increase the chances of that success in the 
sales (lease) contract. Its reason for doing so is straightforward: 
decreasing the riskiness of the enterprise increases the price 
 
 160. See Defense Acquisitions: Managing Risk to Achieve Better Outcomes, 
Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Def. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 
111th Cong. 5–7 (2010) (statements of Paul Francis, Managing Director, Ac-
quisition and Sourcing Management; Michael Golden, Managing Associate 
General Counsel, Acquisition and Sourcing Management; William Woods, Di-
rector, Acquisition and Sourcing Management), available at http://www.gao 
.gov/new.items/d10374t.pdf (describing types of contracts used by the Defense 
Department and objections to them); Daniel Michaels & August Cole, Defense 
Contractors Resist Fixed-Price Jobs, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2009, at B3 (same). 
 161. For a discussion of the market for municipal debt, see supra notes 
137–45 and accompanying text.  
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the investors will pay for it up front. Investors will not pay 
much for an enterprise that may be taxed or regulated out of 
existence in short order, nor for one that is likely to face compe-
tition sponsored by its contractual partner. Privatization deals 
often include analogues to the “covenants not to compete” found 
in wholly private business purchase agreements. However, the 
terms of a privatization deal’s noncompetition clause tends to 
last for a longer period of time and is often more restrictive 
than those found in private contracts. 
For example, tollway and bridge deals often limit the sell-
ing jurisdiction’s ability to build competing tollways, roads, or 
bridges for the term of the lease, while containing covenants 
about the level of tolls allowed to be charged.162 Although some 
of the leases provide exceptions to the no-competition clause if 
certain usage criteria are exceeded, others do not.163 Contracts 
may instead protect against the consequences of unforeseen in-
creases or changes in demand, such as huge traffic jams and 
delays, by specifying performance criteria.164 Of course, predict-
ing the performance criteria that will be important over the 
next seventy-five years is impossible. This is one of the difficul-
ties with such a long contractual term.  
The Chicago parking contract similarly protects the private 
investor against loss not only by providing scheduled rate in-
creases over the term of the contract but also by guaranteeing 
the number of parking spaces and their hours of operation.165 
Further, Chicago must compensate the investors for any loss of 
parking demand attributable to the City’s (or for that matter, 
“the County of Cook or the State of Illinois (or any subdivision 
 
 162. See GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 45–47 (noting that “fully restrictive 
noncompete clauses” are avoided and describing existing clauses); Buxbaum & 
Ortiz, supra note 107, at 10–11 (describing provisions). Some of these provisions 
require an offending state to compensate the private investors for amounts 
lost as a result of the competing roads. See id. at 46 (Texas and Indiana). 
 163. See GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 36 (explaining the change in con-
tractual terms in agreements entered into after the California DOT was forced 
to buy out concessionaires to deal with congestion problems). 
 164. See id. at 42–43 (describing provisions in Indiana, Texas, and Toronto 
concessions).  
 165. See CHICAGO PARKING METER CONCESSION, supra note 5, at 50,590. If 
they fall below the standard set in the contract, the City must provide the in-
vestors with monetary compensation for lost revenues. See id. at 50,621. When 
streets are closed to parking on account of weather or street fairs, the City 
must pay the parking operator revenues equivalent to the meter revenues that 
would have been generated had the streets remained open. See id. at 50,589.  
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or agency of any of the foregoing)”)166 actions,167 though the 
scope of that responsibility is unclear.168 The contractual lan-
guage is drafted broadly enough that it might give pause to pol-
iticians thinking about expanding public transportation or re-
zoning plans that might draw commercial traffic away from 
areas where the Concessionaire has parking meter rights.  
This sort of revenue protection makes financial sense 
whether one views the privatization deal as the functional 
equivalent of debt or the purchase of an ongoing business. Pur-
chasers often obtain covenants not to compete in connection 
with their initial purchase agreement, and forbid the transfer 
of assets without payment of adequate compensation.169 Credi-
tors want to get their money back, with interest, and often in-
clude protective covenants in debt agreements. And generally 
speaking, creditors do not forgive debt just because the debtor 
views repayment as inconvenient. However, the funds neces-
sary to repay conventional government debt can come from a 
variety of revenue sources. An indebted municipality can 
choose to raise additional funds from any tax it is authorized to 
levy—be it a property tax, a sales tax, a transactions tax, or in 
some jurisdictions, an income tax.  
By borrowing money in the form of a privatization agree-
ment, localities lose that flexibility. They have to repay their 
constructive debt through parking or toll revenues, even if in 
the intervening years, the government decides it would prefer 
to raise revenues from a different tax or fee base. A government 
 
 166. Id. at 50,618–19. 
 167. See id. The City also has to compensate the investors if it builds new 
indoor parking garages or increases parking taxes. See id. at 50,573–74, 
50,589–90. 
 168. Covered government actions include all those “Reserved Powers” spe-
cifically described in section 7.3 of the Agreement as “Reserved Powers” that 
the City may undertake but only with notification to the Concessionaire, and 
with stated compensation rights. See id. at 50,584. In addition, the contract 
provides that other “Adverse Actions” by the City or other governmental enti-
ties which will have “a material adverse effect on the fair market value of the 
Concessionaire Interest” entitles the Concessionaire to “AA Compensation” or 
to elect termination followed by payment of its “Concession Value.” See id. at 
50,618–19. Whether an “Adverse Action” would include, for example, an ex-
pansion of the City’s public transportation system or a change in zoning regu-
lations opening new areas of the City to commercial development (and perhaps 
decreasing the use of parking meters in older commercial areas) is unclear.  
 169. See Gillian Lester & Elizabeth Ryan, Choice of Law and Employee Re-
strictive Covenants: An American Perspective, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 389, 
393 n.21 (2010) (discussing “covenants not to compete . . . connected to the 
purchase and sale of a business or its assets”). 
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might legitimately decide, for example, that street parking 
should be subsidized with heavier property or income taxes, or, 
alternatively, it might decide to encourage public transporta-
tion by imposing almost punitive taxes on street parking. There 
is no reason to think that such intrusions in public policy deci-
sions are, on the whole, beneficial. Indeed, the longer the term 
of such privatization agreements, the less likely it is that these 
policy constraints will be beneficial simply because the officials 
drafting the agreement will know less about future conditions 
and problems. It is worth noting that most covenants not to 
compete are, as a matter of law, extremely time limited.170 
Chicago (and other governments) could, in theory, buy out 
its contractual partner if it wanted to finance this implicit debt 
from sources other than parking meter revenues.171 That is, it 
could borrow money from another source, pay off its contractual 
partner, and then use whatever funds it so desired to repay the 
new debt. However, buying one’s way out of a privatization 
agreement is likely to be much more complex than refinancing 
a debt. A city cannot simply repay an amortized portion of the 
initial purchase price, perhaps with an interest-rate adjust-
ment calculated with reference to market-established discount 
rates.172 Instead, investors may be entitled to receive the 
present value of their interest in the privatized function.173 
That is the standard measure of contract damages, and it ap-
plies in many government contract situations.174 In the case of 
 
 170. See Douglas G. Baird, Discharge, Waiver, and the Behavioral Under-
currents of Debtor-Creditor Law, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 17, 30 (2006) (“Covenants 
not to compete are suspect under nonbankruptcy law. They must be reasonable, 
and they can last only for a limited period of time . . . .”); Lester & Ryan, supra 
note 169, at 390 (“There is a strong imperative that the [covenant not to com-
pete] be no greater in terms of duration, geographic scope, and limitation on 
vocational activities than is reasonably necessary to protect the interests of 
the employer.”). 
 171. Indeed, one of the first U.S. tollway privatizations was undone this 
way. See GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 36 (describing California’s buyback of 
SR-91 express lanes to allow improvement of adjacent public lanes).  
 172. See, e.g., CHICAGO PARKING METER CONCESSION, supra note 5, at 
50,637 (establishing the City’s responsibility to pay “the Metered Parking Sys-
tem Concession Value as of the date of ” the buyout). 
 173. See, e.g., id. 
 174. Privatization agreements generally require governmental entities to 
make them whole for any interference with contractual rights. See GAO 
REPORT, supra note 4, at 46 (describing “compensation clauses”). Under the 
terms of the Chicago parking meter lease, the Concessionaire would be en-
titled to such an amount in the event Chicago attempted to terminate the 
agreement for its “convenience” as this would constitute a breach of the 
agreement. See CHICAGO PARKING METER CONCESSION, supra note 5, at 
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the Chicago parking meter agreement, this would mean an 
amount calculated with reference to then-current projections of 
parking demand and other variables.175 The contract specifies 
that third-party appraisers determine this value.176 In practice, 
the process of determining value is likely to be an expensive 
and fraught procedure given the pricing problems described 
above, thus posing a significant barrier to the use of the buyout 
provision.  
The underlying contract terms are not the only impedi-
ment to buyouts. Arranging a substitute debt transaction is 
neither a trivial nor cheap transaction.177 These costs discour-
 
50,637 (providing that the City may not terminate “this Agreement for conven-
ience”). Damages under a contract which could be terminated for “conven-
ience” would be limited to reliance damages. See Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. 
Sykes, Governmental Liability for Breach of Contract, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 
313, 354 (1999) (“The effect of ‘termination for convenience’ is to reduce the 
government’s liability to the contractor relative to what the government would 
owe if the termination were treated as a branch (which would entitle the con-
tractor to expectation damages).”); Gillian Hadfield, Of Sovereignty and Con-
tract: Damages for Breach of Contract by Government, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. 
L.J. 467, 492 (1999) (discussing the measure of damages for breach of federal 
procurement contracts). Even calculating reliance damages for a contract such 
as the Chicago parking meter lease would be difficult. Given the absence of a 
stated principal amount, interest rate, or amortization schedule, it would be far 
from obvious how much of the initial payment received by the City would re-
main to be recouped through damages and how much would have already been 
recouped through the parking fees received prior to the contract’s termination. 
 175. Among those variables are governmental policies which increase the 
value of the parking spaces. Suppose, for example, that Chicago decides to 
transform more formerly “free” parking spaces to metered spaces. By eliminat-
ing cheaper parking alternatives, this policy change likely would increase the 
demand for, and the value of, spaces covered by the Concession Agreement. 
Interestingly, some foreign privatization deals contain clauses allowing inter-
im renegotiation “if it is in the public interest to do so.” GAO REPORT, supra 
note 4, at 47; see also Pagano, supra note 4, at 384 (arguing for “require[d] 
. . . renegotiation at intervals throughout the term of the contract”). Chicago’s 
parking meter agreement, however, provides that the City “may only termi-
nate this Agreement in accordance with the express terms hereof and shall 
not, in any event, have the right to terminate this Agreement for convenience.” 
CHICAGO PARKING METER CONCESSION, supra note 5, at 50,637. The “express 
terms” of the Agreement allow termination only if the Concessionaire defaults 
on one or more of its contractual responsibilities. See id. at 50,626–29. 
 176. See CHICAGO PARKING METER CONCESSION, supra note 5, at 50,622 
(describing the computation of compensation required in the event of a “Re-
served Powers Adverse Action”). 
 177. See U.S. TREASURY DEPT., TREASURY ANALYSIS OF BUILD AMERICA 
BONDS AND ISSUER NET BORROWING COSTS 9 (2010), available at http:// 
www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/economicpolicy/Documents/4%202%2010% 
20BABs%20Savings%20Report%20FINAL.pdf (“[T]he weighted average of the 
underwriting fees for tax-exempt bonds issued in 2009 and early 2010 was 
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age governments from changing course in midstream and 
switching from privatization debt to conventional debt. Fur-
ther, when the actual cost of a privatization agreement is 
enormous, jurisdictions may be loathe to admit the exact size of 
the hole they dug for their constituents, as would be required 
should they convert the deal into conventional debt.178 It is 
generally easier to carry on with the original deal, for better or 
for worse. 
The incentives for stasis are particularly troubling given 
the term of these privatization deals. The term of the average 
U.S. privatization agreement is twice the length of those in Eu-
ropean privatization agreements.179 Tollway deals in the Unit-
ed States last for ninety years; similar deals in Europe last 
thirty or forty years.180 The Chicago parking meter deal runs 
for seventy-five years.181 Generally speaking, because of both 
uncertainty and the time value of money, lengthening the term 
 
$6.19 per $1,000.”); Eddie Baeb, Bond Advisers Irk Wall Street, Curb Fees on 
Public Finance, BLOOMBERG.COM, June 30, 2005, http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aXuOdXOe6Jt4&refer=canada (noting that 
“[u]nderwriting fees range from $5.53 to $6.45 per $1,000 of bonds,” but pro-
viding examples where “independent advisors” negotiated substantially lower 
prices). Underwriting fees are only part of the cost of issuing debt; financial 
advisors, attorneys, and credit agency rating fees also can be substantial. See 
Gillette, Democracy and Debt, supra note 42, at 400–01 (“Bond lawyers, finan-
cial advisors, and underwriters earn significant fees for putting together and 
marketing transactions involving municipal obligations . . . . The pursuit of 
such business has apparently been so lucrative that the Municipal Securities 
Rulemaking Board intervened in 1994 to promulgate a rule against political 
contributions to municipal officials by ‘municipal finance professionals’ on the 
grounds that such contributions had become a primary means of attracting 
municipal underwriting business.”). Large as these sums are, they are consid-
erably lower than the fees reaped in privatization deals. See Jenny Anderson, 
Turning Asphalt to Gold: Australian Bank Pursues Toll Roads and Other Pub-
lic Works, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2006, at C-1, available at 2006 WLNR 1081037 
(“The potential for fees in these public infrastructure deals is astounding, even 
by Wall Street’s obsessive and excessive fee standards. Bankers can make advi-
sory fees on the sale of the often-large assets. Then, once packaged into funds, 
the assets earn Macquarie management fees (1 to 1.5 percent) as well as in-
centive fees: 20 percent on profits above a certain threshold . . . . In essence, its 
deals are like leveraged buyouts: it provides the equity, borrows the debt and 
rakes in rich fees.”). Of course, in many jurisdictions and for some types of 
debt, the cost of a successful referendum must be added to bond issuance costs.  
 178. They would, at the very least, be required to determine the principal 
amount of the outstanding debt as well as the rate of interest payable on that 
principal. 
 179. See Buxbaum & Ortiz, supra note 107, at 10 (“In other countries, the 
typical length of concession agreements is 30 to 40 years.”). 
 180. Id. 
 181. INSPECTOR GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 107, at 1. 
  
2016 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:1965 
 
of these contracts adds little economic value to the deal. For ex-
ample, only seven percent of the sales price in the Chicago 
parking meter contract was attributable to years thirty-seven 
through seventy-five of the agreement.182 What the additional 
years may sometimes add is tax value—federal income tax val-
ue—which increases the value of the deal to the investors and 
thus the price they are willing to pay participating govern-
ments. Investors may claim generous depreciation deduc-
tions183 only with respect to property that they own; deductions 
with respect to leased property must be claimed by the les-
sor.184 If these privatization deals were classified as leases for 
tax purposes, the lessor would be a government that is not sub-
ject to federal income tax, and for whom the generous deprecia-
tion deductions therefore would provide no benefit. However, 
the IRS is willing to treat lessees/concessionaires as owners for 
tax purposes when the term of the lease exceeds the design life 
of the asset at the time of the transaction.185 In many situa-
tions, twenty or thirty years would not meet this standard, 
 
 182. See INSPECTOR GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 107, at 6 (“93% of the 
lease payment was to pay the City for the value of the first 50% of the 75-year 
period (37 years).”). 
 183. Much of the purchase price can be depreciated over the fifteen-year 
period specified in § 197 of the Internal Revenue Code, rather than over the 
longer lease term. See GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 27 n.18 (describing the 
effect of § 197 on tollway leases); Memorandum from Subcomm. on Highways 
and Transit Staff to Members of the Subcomm. on Highways and Transit 7 
(Feb. 12, 2007), available at http://books.google.com/ (search “Memorandum to 
Members of the Subcommittee on Highways and Transit Re Hearing on Pub-
lic-Private Partnerships: Innovative Financing and Protecting the Public In-
terest”) (explaining that the portion of the upfront payment in a tollway lease 
allocated “to the right to impose and collect tolls” is amortized over fifteen 
years). The portion of the payment allocable to the right to collect parking me-
ter revenues in the parking meter lease is analogous to the right to impose 
and collect tolls.  
 184. See BITTKER ET AL., supra note 91, ¶ 14.06 (“Lessors are entitled to 
depreciation deductions . . . because, as owners, they bear the burdens of ex-
haustion, wear and tear, and obsolescence.”).  
 185. See Rev. Rul. 55-541, 1955-2 C.B. 19 (holding that the lease transfers 
“equitable ownership” when lessee “will enjoy all of the benefits of ownership 
for substantially the entire useful life of the property”); Pagano, supra note 4, 
at 374 (“The long terms of the agreements arise in part from the economic 
benefit that the toll road company gets by claiming accelerated depreciation 
for tax purposes.”); Memorandum from Subcomm. on Highways and Transit 
Staff, supra note 183, at 7 (explaining the tax consequences of extended term 
agreements). But see INSPECTOR GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 107, at 19 
(arguing that a shorter lease period would have been sufficient). 
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while seventy-five or ninety years would.186 Accordingly, by 
lengthening the terms of the contracts, the parties may gain 
access to a valuable tax benefit—a benefit that they can split 
between themselves by adjusting the stated purchase price. In 
sum, these privatization deals are not only a method of circum-
venting debt limitations, many of these deals are also tax shel-
ters in that they shift the economic benefits of accelerated de-
preciation from a tax-indifferent party (state and local 
governments are not subject to the federal income tax) to a tax-
able party (the private investor).187 Unfortunately, one price 
some jurisdiction must pay to access the shelter is a contract 
with a term that lasts generations. 
Given the favorable federal income tax treatment of munic-
ipal debt, it may be difficult to justify looking askance at this 
collusion between investors and local governments in the pur-
suit of tax benefits.188 The benefits investors obtain from accel-
erated depreciation are certainly no greater, and are most like-
ly less, than those they would have obtained had they invested 
 
 186. See Pagano, supra note 4, at 374 (“In order for the concessionaire to 
qualify as an owner eligible to deduct depreciation, the lease term must exceed 
the useful life of the asset.”). Tax considerations mandate long lease terms in 
tollway privatization contracts; however, the parking meter contract could 
have run for a shorter period without imperiling the tax benefits delivered to 
investors. See INSPECTOR GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 107, at 5 (“While 
there are arguments in favor of longer leases (like 75 years) in certain situa-
tions—namely, the unavailability of favorable tax-depreciation status . . .—
they simply do not apply here.”).  
 187. Though it is tempting to blame these transactions on the oddities of 
the Internal Revenue Code, and suggest that the Code be amended to shut 
them down, this is easier said than done. Not only will it be difficult to come 
up with a tax rule that punishes (makes undesirable) only these transactions, 
tax considerations are not the sole driver of long lease terms. See supra note 
186 (noting the length of Chicago’s parking meter transaction cannot be attri-
buted to tax considerations).  
 188. Section 103 of the Internal Revenue Code excludes interest received 
from certain bonds issued by state and local governments from income for tax 
purposes. See 26 U.S.C. § 103 (2006). Investors in such bonds pass some or all 
of the benefits of exclusion to the issuing government by accepting a lower rate 
of interest on these bonds. Essentially, then, § 103 is a complicated (and most 
would argue inefficient) method by which the federal government subsidizes 
government borrowers. See, e.g., Calvin H. Johnson, A Thermometer for the 
Tax System: The Overall Health of the Tax System as Measured by Implicit 
Tax, 56 SMU L. REV. 13, 17 (2003) (“Indeed, the § 103 exemption probably 
does considerably more harm than good overall.”); Stanley A. Koppelman, Tax 
Arbitrage and the Interest Deduction, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1177 (1988) 
(“The differential between taxable and tax-exempt bond rates has not ap-
proached the highest marginal tax rate.”).  
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in more traditional governmental debt obligations.189 That said, 
since the Internal Revenue Code already gives favorable treat-
ment to municipal debt, it is hard to understand why munici-
palities need another path to obtain favorable tax treatment, 
particularly a path that may induce yet additional distortions 
in government policy.  
These distortions are all the more troubling because they 
are all too often invisible to the voting public at the time that 
the public might be able to exercise some political control, be-
fore the deals have been enacted. As the next section shows, at-
taching the privatization label to these transactions all too of-
ten leads observers to miss the fact that they are a form of debt. 
C. TRANSACTIONAL TRANSPARENCY 
The public does not seem to appreciate the economic simi-
larity between modern privatization agreements, debt, and the 
advance sale of tax revenues.190 Politicians seem to be in no 
hurry to enlighten the public. Former Mayor Daley, for exam-
ple, touted Chicago’s use of proceeds from privatizing the Sky-
way (a toll road connecting the City to the Indiana Toll Road) to 
“pay off nearly $1 billion in long term debt,”191 obscuring the 
reality that the preexisting debt was being refinanced. Of 
course, if the mayor had admitted that the Skyway deal merely 
refinanced the underlying debt—by substituting future tollway 
fees paid directly to the new “owners” for fees paid to the Sky-
way Authority, which would use the proceeds to pay bondhold-
ers—he might have had to explain why it made sense to pay an 
implicit interest rate of ten percent on the new debt192 when 
 
 189. Accelerated depreciation generates time value of money gains while 
§ 103 provides a complete exclusion from income. 26 U.S.C. § 103(a). In both 
cases, however, because access to the favorable tax treatment is mediated by 
another party, it is unclear how much of the tax benefit goes to that other par-
ty as opposed to remaining with the investor. 
 190. It is worth noting that the designer of the parking meter transaction 
did recognize the equivalency of the two types of transactions. In a report writ-
ten to defend the parking meter deal, William Blair asserted (without proffer-
ing any evidence) that the City would have had to pay interest in the ten to 
fourteen percent range if it decided to raise the $1 billion obtained through the 
parking meter deal by issuing parking meter-based revenue bonds. See Blair, 
Valuation Analysis, supra note 114, at 8–9. 
 191. See Richard M. Daley, How We’ll Weather the Storm, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 
11, 2009, at C-21.  
 192. This was the discount rate used by the City and the purchaser in val-
uing the Skyway’s future cash flows. See Greg Hinz, City Council Giddy over 
Skyway Lease, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Oct. 27, 2004), http://www.chicagobusiness 
.com/article/20041027/NEWS02/200014397.  
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the preexisting Skyway and city debt being defeased bore cou-
pon interest rates of between 4.5 and six percent.193 Newspaper 
coverage of these transactions has also been misleading, gener-
ally describing the upfront payments as “windfalls”194 and the 
portion of the payments not immediately spent as reserves.195 
In the Chicago parking meter example, the money contained in 
these “reserves” will have to be paid back to the Concession-
aires in the future in the form of higher fees; they represent 
unspent loan principal rather than what is typically thought of 
as a reserve or a “financial cushion.”196 And like the decision to 
use privatization to defease lower interest bonds, the decision 
to borrow more money than necessary to cover immediate 
needs was questionable. Looked at in isolation, maintaining 
“reserves” would have cost Chicago money; the implicit interest 
rate of ten to fourteen percent payable on the reserves signifi-
cantly exceeded the investment return Chicago expected to 
earn from them.197 
The explanation given for maintaining these reserves, that 
their existence buttresses Chicago’s credit rating and thus re-
 
 193. See CITY OF CHIC., COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR 
THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2008, at 81, 127–28, available at http://www 
.cityofchicago.org/dam/city/depts/fin/supp_info/CAFR/2008/CAFR2008.pdf  (listing 
bonds “defeased” with proceeds from the Skyway deal); U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSP., 
INNOVATION WAVE: AN UPDATE ON THE BURGEONING PRIVATE SECTOR ROLE 
IN U.S. HIGHWAY AND TRANSIT INFRASTRUCTURE 11 (2008), available at http:// 
www.ncppp.org/councilinstitutes/dotpppreport_20080718.pdf  (describing the 
$465 million in Skyway revenue bonds redeemed out of proceeds of the Sky-
way transaction). 
 194. See, e.g., Hal Dardick, Property-Tax Rebates Unclaimed; Small Re-
funds Were Part of Deal on Parking Meters, CHI. TRIB., May 23, 2010, at C-7; 
Fran Spielman, Daley 2009—Flubs and Fiascoes: Privatizing Parking Meters, 
Failing to Win Olympic Bid Leave the Mayor Reeling, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 
27, 2009, at A-16; David Zahniser & Phil Willon, Risks Are Seen in L.A.’s Plan 
to Privatize Garages: A Rushed Bidding Process Could Lead to Undervalued 
Leases of Parking Structures, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2010, at AA-1. 
 195. See Mihalopoulos & Dardick, supra note 123, at C-1. 
 196. See Chicago Parking Meter Facts, supra note 123 (describing reserves 
created by Skyway and parking meter transactions as “a financial cushion 
most cities don’t have”). 
 197. See Blair, Valuation Analysis, supra note 114, at 7–8 (using a discount 
rate of ten to fourteen percent to value parking meter concession); Mick 
Dumke, Fact-Checking Mayor Daley’s Budget Address, CHI. READER (Oct. 21, 
2009, 2:53 PM), http://www.chicagoreader.com/TheBlog/archives/2009/10/21/ 
fact-checking-mayor-daleys-budget-address (questioning the ability of the City 
to earn even its projected five percent return on reserve funds). As discussed 
infra notes 222–23, almost all of the “reserve” funds were spent within two 
years, so that the return issue is academic. 
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duces the cost of newly issued public debt,198 suggests that even 
rating agencies might not understand the similarity between 
these deals and debt. Ordinarily, an enterprise does not im-
prove its fiscal solvency by assuming more debt, even if the en-
terprise invests rather than spends the debt proceeds, because 
the accession to cash is counterbalanced by the repayment obli-
gation. Perhaps the ratings increase resulted from the belief 
that the contractual prices were unjustifiably high, that the 
City was on the right side of the winner’s curse. The most likely 
justification for the improvement in the City’s credit ratings, 
though, is one that highlights the myopic nature of bond rat-
ings: although the transactions may not substantially change 
the City’s overall financial position (at least for the better), the 
maintenance of a reserve makes it less likely that the City will 
default on bonds maturing in the near future. It can use the re-
serve to pay off the early debt, thereby shifting the risk of non-
payment to later bondholders; those defaults would fall outside 
the time horizon covered by the current ratings. As later events 
showed, retention of the favorable bond rating depended on 
continued maintenance of the reserve.199  
The public’s failure to recognize the equivalence between 
the privatization transactions and governmental debt, like its 
uncertainty as to the adequacy of the price received by the gov-
ernment in these transactions, reduces the political feedback 
required to ensure that the government neither overborrows 
nor overspends. If the public does not understand how these 
transactions mortgage future tax revenues, and instead views 
the cash received in these transactions as windfalls or gain, the 
public may be more accepting of political decisions to engage in 
the transactions in the first instance and to spend the transac-
 
 198. The City trumpeted the rating increase as a benefit of its Skyway and 
parking meter privatization deals. See Chicago Parking Meter Facts, supra 
note 123. Chicago’s bond rating went up after its Skyway and parking meter 
deals went through. See Leonard Gilroy, supra note 108 (noting that the deals 
“prompted all three major credit rating firms to raise the city’s bond rating”). 
 199. See Tim Jones, Chicago Mayor Candidate Wants Bond Rating Pro-
tected, BLOOMBERG.COM, Nov. 10, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010 
-11-10/chicago-mayor-candidate-calls-for-protecting-parking-meter-fund.html 
(noting that both Standard & Poor’s and Fitch downgraded Chicago’s credit 
rating due to its “heavy reliance on nonrecurring revenues to bridge its 2011 
budget gap, including the use of most of its remaining reserves from the sale of 
its parking meters”); Yvette Shields, Chicago to Tap Stimulus Programs, BOND 
BUYER, July 30, 2010, http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/119_255/chicago-council 
-budget-2010-1005876-1.html (“Chicago’s reliance on reserves from its parking 
meter lease to erase a good chunk of its $520 million 2010 deficit raised concerns 
among some [and some worried continuation could] drive a downgrade.”). 
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tional proceeds on current needs or desires. Or it may not. The 
public might be as shortsighted as politicians, as eager to spend 
as much as creditors are willing to give them now and worry 
about the consequences later—or leave their children or grand-
children to worry about the consequences. It is impossible to 
predict with any certainty whether the general public would 
approve of these transactions if they fully understood them. 
The point, though, is that the power to approve or disapprove 
means nothing when that understanding is lacking. Casting 
loans in the form of privatization transactions reduces the like-
lihood that the public understands what their politicians are 
doing on their behalf.  
In sum, it is questionable whether the potential gains from 
privatization are worth their cost, or whether, given the inher-
ent difficulties and opportunities for abuse in such deals, at-
tempts should be made to discourage them and, instead, to try 
to force local governments to borrow using conventional debt 
formats. Of course, even if the answer to that question is “yes,” 
the question remains whether it is possible to achieve that end.  
IV.  REINING IN SMOKE-AND-MIRROR ACCOUNTING 
AND LIMITING DEAD-HAND CONTROL   
The last time the temptation to provide municipal govern-
ment services without accompanying taxation led to fiscal dis-
aster, the response was to limit municipalities’ ability to incur 
debt.200 However, over time, municipalities (like states) have 
developed a plethora of mechanisms to achieve the fiscal aims 
of debt without, as a technical matter, incurring any debt at 
all.201 Few courts faced with such transactions have been will-
ing to extend the definition of debt to bring these analogous 
transactions within the scope of existing limitations.202 The re-
sults of those debt avoidance techniques are not always pretty, 
and they are getting less pretty all the time. The question is 
what, if anything, can be done. 
 
 200. See supra notes 33–42 and accompanying text. 
 201. See supra Part II. 
 202. See Richard Briffault, Foreword: The Disfavored Constitution: State 
Fiscal Limits and State Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 940 (2003) 
(“Indeed, the debt provisions are often treated as little more than technical 
shoals to be navigated by clever lawyering rather than as embodiments of sub-
stantively valuable principles.”); id. at 948 (explaining that “courts are complicit 
in the widespread evasion of constitutional restrictions [on debt]”); Gillette, 
supra note 30, at 1256 (“A century and a half of judicial construction of these 
clauses has dramatically reduced the significance of debt limitations.”). 
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One possibility, floated by some analysts, is to simply get 
rid of the various limitations on state and local government 
debt.203 Another possibility is to try to prohibit certain, particu-
larly objectionable, types of transactions. A third option is to 
achieve the same result by eliminating the financial and politi-
cal advantages of engaging in the most troubling transactions. 
This final Part discusses each of these options in detail. 
A. ELIMINATING DEBT RESTRICTIONS 
The simplest option (in terms of explanation, though not 
necessarily in terms of implementation) is for states to elimi-
nate their restrictions on governmental debt. This option would 
require states to amend their constitutions and statutes so as 
to get rid of debt caps, legislative supermajority, and referenda 
requirements; states would then police all debt transactions 
through the regular political (and market) process. If one con-
cludes that the debt restrictions are doing more harm than 
good by encouraging the use of evermore harmful alternatives 
to debt without significantly holding down the overall amount 
of debt-like transactions, throwing in the towel and eliminating 
the restrictions might encourage politicians to move toward the 
use of less harmful, conventional debt transactions. As a result, 
some of the pricing issues and distortions in public policy might 
disappear. As noted above, several commentators have made 
precisely this suggestion.204 
The unanswered question is how many of these destructive 
transactions would go away if debt restrictions were removed. 
Although the transactional forms, including privatization, may 
have been developed to avoid running afoul of debt limitations, 
it can be hard to put a genie back into the bottle. Now that ju-
risdictions are familiar with the privatization mechanism, they 
may continue to enter into them because they lack transparen-
cy; such transactions may be more politically acceptable than 
 
 203. See Briffault, supra note 202, at 949 (“[A] constitutional debt limit 
seems attractive in theory but it has proven extremely difficult to operational-
ize in practice.”); Gillette, supra note 30, at 1259 (“[T]he relevant inquiry is 
whether debt limitations that seem haphazard and that are systematically, 
but expensively, evaded add anything to admittedly imperfect market based 
constraints, or whether they simply further distort local financing decisions. 
My tentative conclusion here . . . is that even flawed market constraints on lo-
cal officials may be better suited than legal constraints to balance the objec-
tives . . . .”). 
 204. See supra notes 6–7. 
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deciding to issue additional public debt.205 Moreover, nondebt 
debt may be useful in avoiding budgetary controls other than 
debt limitations. It is worth noting that Chicago, one of the 
leaders of privatization, is not subject to a debt limitation.206 
Although its politicians are bound by a balanced-budget re-
quirement,207 it appears that, as in many jurisdictions, bor-
rowed funds may be used to reach the necessary balance.208 
Thus, Chicago’s leadership in privatization transactions seems 
to stem more from the political appeal of hiding debt in the 
form of privatization transactions than from legal restrictions 
on its use of debt. 
Simply removing one of the spurs for engaging in privati-
zation agreements, then, may not be enough. Legal changes 
that operate more directly on faux privatization agreements 
may be preferable, or a necessary supplement, to eliminating 
debt restrictions. 
 
 205. See supra notes 192–99 and accompanying text (explaining that the 
public is led to believe that the privatization deals create windfalls, making 
them more politically palatable than taking on debt). 
 206. The Illinois Constitution allows the state legislature to restrict local 
government debt. See ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6( j)–(k) (granting the state legis-
lature the power to limit debt incurred by home-rule counties and municipali-
ties); id. art. VII, § 7 (nonhome-rule counties and municipalities have the right 
“to incur debt except as limited by law and except that debt payable from ad 
valorem property tax receipts shall mature within 40 years from the time it is 
incurred”). Thus far, however, the legislature has restricted only the debt-
issuance powers of nonhome-rule local governments. See Local Government 
Debt Limitation Act, 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1 et seq. (2010). Chicago has 
home rule. See ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a) (“A County which has . . . a popula-
tion of more than 25,000 are home rule units.”).  
 207. See 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-2-2 (2010) (“Prior to November 15 of each 
year, the mayor . . . shall submit to the corporate authorities the executive 
budget [which] shall provide the basis upon which the annual appropriation 
ordinance is prepared and enacted. . . . All of these estimates shall be so segre-
gated and classified as to funds and in such other manner as to give effect to 
the requirements of law . . . to the end that no expenditure shall be authorized 
or made for any purpose in excess of funds lawfully available therefor.”); see 
also id. 5/8-2-6(d) (limiting appropriations to “the aggregate amount available 
in that fund or for that purpose as shown by the estimates of the available as-
sets thereof at the beginning of the fiscal year for which appropriations are 
made and of taxes and other current revenue set forth in the budget document”).  
 208. The statute requires the mayor only to state the source of funds for 
planned expenditures; like many balanced-budget requirements, it does not 
appear to rule out the use of debt as a source of such funds. See id. 5/8-2-2; see 
also BRIFFAULT, supra note 140, at 9–10 (giving examples of similarly lax 
rules in other states). 
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B. DIRECT ATTACKS ON PRIVATIZATION/SALES OF TAX 
REVENUES 
If there is a role for direct attacks on privatization transac-
tions, the question becomes what form the attack should take. 
Two quite different approaches to this problem are possible. 
One option is to identify the particularly troubling transac-
tions, subsets of general privatization transactions, and limit or 
forbid those transactions. A second option would be to identify 
the harmful effects of the transactions, and limit or forbid all 
transactions that give rise to those effects. The remaining ques-
tion is which of these approaches is most likely to generate the 
desired result without undercutting the possibility of achieving 
privatization gains. 
1. Limiting Particular Transactions 
The biggest challenge with trying to control the problem of 
overcommitting (or overcontrolling) future generations by limit-
ing particular transactions is coming up with an adequate defi-
nition of the transactions (or transactional terms) that should 
be limited. In this age of financial engineering, most transac-
tions can be cast in several different forms; all that matters is 
the cash flow. This is precisely the reason earlier attempts to 
control excessive municipal debt failed to achieve their in-
tended purpose.209 Governments were able to recast financing 
arrangements as tax concessions, sale-leasebacks, leases, or 
sales—all of which fall outside the literal description of the 
transactions subject to legal limitations.210 Some of these 
transactions did not exist when jurisdictions first established 
the original limitations; others may have existed but lawmak-
ers did not realize how they could be used to circumvent debt 
limitations and thus did not draft the rules to encompass them.  
The same combination of ignorance and lack of imagination 
would likely doom any attempt to limit functional substitutes 
for debt transactions such as sales of future tax revenues. Giv-
en the amount of money at stake, investment bankers and at-
torneys would likely dream up new variations on old themes. 
Were the state to forbid the sale or lease of tax revenue 
 
 209. See supra notes 40–49 and accompanying text (explaining that with 
new debt-limiting restrictions placed on municipalities, municipalities entered 
deals that fell outside the restrictions but contained similar debt-like conse-
quences). 
 210. See supra Part II (describing the myriad of ways governments worked 
around debt restrictions). 
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streams, localities could find a way to recast their transactions 
to fall outside the literal definition of the statutory ban. They 
might, for example, sell derivatives, giving purchasers rights to 
sums based on the amount of taxes collected at a certain point 
in time. Alternatively, localities might sell, instead of tax reve-
nues, property subject to an irrevocable tax concession—or 
simply sell the tax concessions. Just as in some states parents 
can prepay in-state college tuitions for their children, localities 
might allow property owners to prepay ten or twenty years of 
property tax obligations in the form of an up-front flat fee; once 
having paid the fee, the property owners would be held harm-
less in the event of subsequent increases in either assessed 
value for property tax purposes or increases in property tax 
rates. Given courts’ demonstrated reluctance to interfere with 
past techniques used to avoid state constitutional debt limita-
tions,211 they may well reject attempts to look through these 
new techniques in order to create a penumbra of protection 
against forbidden tax sales. The potential to rearrange and re-
cast economically similar transactions so that they fall outside 
the definition of any statutorily disfavored transaction could al-
so undermine any attempt to subject specific transactions to 
special procedural protections, such as a referendum require-
ment. 
Perhaps broader drafting to include a wider variety of 
transactions within the proscribed category would solve (or at 
least reduce the problems posed by) recharacterization oppor-
tunities. However, broader drafting would create a problem of 
its own, namely it could delegitimize too many transactions. 
Virtually every contractual arrangement entered into by a mu-
nicipality has some impact on the entity’s future financial free-
dom. For example, employment contracts (other than contracts 
at the will of either party) obligate employers to pay compensa-
tion in future years, yet it is probably unnecessary to treat the 
costs of these contracts as a debt or a tax sale or subject these 
contracts to special procedural limitations. Moreover, it is poss-
ible to view most rental agreements, even short-term rental 
agreements, as creating a municipal debt, since normally a 
government cannot renege on such contracts without paying 
damages. It is hard to conceive a government functioning if 
every contractual relationship had to be scrutinized on these 
grounds. 
 
 211. See BRIFFAULT, supra note 140, at 49 (giving examples of state courts 
that “have effectively read debt limits out of their constitutions”). 
  
2026 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:1965 
 
Focusing on objectionable contract terms might be more 
profitable than focusing on types of transactions. If there are 
certain terms that routinely occur in debt substitution transac-
tions, and if those terms are causally related to the transac-
tion’s shift of tax revenues from one period to another, then it 
may be possible to restrict the offensive transactions by re-
stricting the objectionable terms. But what terms would these 
be? 
One term that has received some adverse comment is the 
length of contractual obligations. Chicago’s parking meter lease 
agreement runs for seventy-five years, a term that struck many 
as unduly long.212 As noted earlier, the duration of state toll-
way privatization arrangements exceeds the duration of similar 
arrangements entered into by foreign governmental agen-
cies.213 There is a general tendency in law to disparage overly 
long obligations, a tendency at least as old as the rule against 
perpetuities. However attractive length initially seems as an 
aggravating factor, closer inspection reveals that it is a less 
than compelling object of regulation. 
In the first place, it would be very difficult to identify a 
proper or nonsuspicious length for municipal contracts. A short 
time period would serve some purposes, but it would undercut 
other valuable goals. It all depends on context. If a state law 
restricted contract terms to five-year periods, a city could sell, 
at the most, five years of tax revenues, or the right to collect 
parking meter fees or the like for, at the most, a five-year pe-
riod. Given the limitations on the length of the contract, the fi-
nancial effects of such contracts would be felt largely within the 
political lifetime of the politicians responsible for entering into 
the contract. Robbing Peter to pay Paul accomplishes very little 
when Peter and Paul are the same individual. Politicians might 
stay in office for a few more years, but the majority of them 
would still be around for the public to vilify, disgrace, or simply 
throw out of office when the bill comes due.  
 
 212. See Robert C. Longworth, Privatizing—Yes or No?, MIDWESTERNER 
(Sept. 29, 2010), http://globalmidwest.typepad.com/global-midwest/2010/09/ 
privatizing-yes-or-no.html (arguing that almost all deals privatizing the deliv-
ery of transportation infrastructure are too long). To put the parking meter 
lease into perspective, the contract’s length is only slightly longer than the 
history of the automobile. Ford’s Model T went into production in 1909, nearly 
one hundred years before the seventy-five year contract was signed. See 
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1451 (1976). 
 213. See supra notes 179–82 and accompanying text.  
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Unfortunately, it is impossible to set a term that is short 
enough to force politicians to internalize costs without dimin-
ishing opportunities for some types of beneficial privatization. 
It may be efficient for a contract to tie the compensation of a 
contractor, who is rebuilding a tollway or other highway infra-
structure project, to usage of the road through a lease ar-
rangement. Such arrangements might provide effective in-
ducements to efficient scheduling of repairs and encourage 
quality workmanship. However, no one would want the private 
contractor to think only in terms of a five- or ten-year time ho-
rizon for fear that it would use cheaper materials or substand-
ard construction techniques that would last for only that period 
of time. A longer-term contract may be necessary to ensure that 
the private actor has the incentive to do its part of the bargain 
in the way that most benefits the public.  
Similarly, if the benefit of privatization is that it diffuses 
political opposition to necessary but unpopular actions, the 
shorter the contract term, the less the political insulation it 
provides. One reason given for Chicago’s privatization of its 
parking meters was the mayor’s desire to avoid constant battles 
over raising parking rates; the result of that battle, according 
to the City, was that such rates (prior to privatization) had long 
failed to keep pace with inflation, thus denying the City what 
seemed like an appropriate source of revenue.214 The City 
touted the deal—like the tollway deal that preceded it215—as a 
device that allowed city politicians to commit to a policy they 
believed was correct, but unpopular with the public: raising 
parking fees to keep up with inflation.216 
 
 214. See INSPECTOR GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 107, at 4 (“The City 
has also argued that it would make no sense to calculate the value of the park-
ing-meter system to the City under the terms of the lease, because . . . it would 
have been impossible for the City to have both kept the parking-meter system 
and raised the rates to the same extent as the lease, because there was not 
sufficient political will to do so . . . .”); Blair, Valuation Analysis, supra note 
114, at 4 (describing the assumption that the City would increase parking 
rates at annual rate of three percent as “aggressive given the fact that the 
rates on 75% [of ] City meters had not increased in over 20 years [despite] 
. . . the rate of inflation average [of ] approximately 3.2% per year”).  
 215. See supra notes 148–52 and accompanying text.  
 216. See Joravsky & Dumke, supra note 145 (describing the history of at-
tempted rate increases and suggesting the aborted attempt to raise meter 
rates was “a maneuver by the city to boost the value of the meters while per-
suading aldermen it would be better to let a private company raise the rates 
and take the heat”). The alderman may have thought the lease was a good way 
to raise parking meter rates, but this does not mean, of course, that the deci-
sion to enter into this seventy-five year long contract was anything close to the 
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In addition, a fixed term limit could interfere with a num-
ber of normal contractual arrangements. Academic tenure, for 
example, would likely be impossible. Outright sales of property 
might be questioned, since the effect of a sale lasts forever. 
Short-term contracts with renewal clauses might be thrown in-
to question, since those contracts might—or might not—
circumvent any term-limit requirement.  
Indeed, the length of the contractual relationship is only 
part of the problem with Chicago’s parking contract and similar 
deals. The underlying issue stems from the temporal mismatch 
between the costs and benefits of the contractual arrangement. 
In sale-leaseback agreements, advance sales of tax revenues, 
and variations of these two arrangements, such as the Chicago 
parking contract, the distinguishing feature is the large upfront 
payment the selling government receives upon entry into the 
contract—the upfront payment that future taxpayers must re-
pay in the form of reduced future revenues without any offset 
in the form of valuable government services. The amount of 
this obscured debt can be substantial.  
The City of Chicago, for example, received $1.156 billion 
when it entered into the parking contract.217 All of that money 
was an advance payment for the fees the other party expected 
to receive over the next seventy-five years—fees in excess of the 
amounts the Concessionaire will likely spend on providing 
parking services. In the absence of the contract, future resi-
dents of Chicago, as opposed to those residing in Chicago at the 
date the contract was entered into, would have benefited from 
the fees covered by the contract either in the form of additional 
city revenues, if city authorities raised parking fees, or in the 
form of lower parking rates. The contract leaves current Chica-
goans with revenue and future Chicagoans paying higher park-
ing fees. Those higher fees, of course, go to a private party, not 
the City’s treasury. The minor improvement of the parking me-
ter system provided a smokescreen for the sale of what would 
have been future, unrestricted city revenues. Although Chica-
go’s mayor at the time pledged not to spend the entirety of the 
funds received under the contract, and to instead hold a sub-
stantial amount in reserve to offset the effects of the associated 
 
most desirable way of raising parking rates. One person’s counterproductive 
political grandstanding may be another person’s desirable political check; per-
haps parking fees should not increase in tandem with the inflation rate in the 
absence of a political check. 
 217. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.  
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future revenue losses,218 the pledge was not legally—or, as it 
turns out, politically—binding. The City spent much of the “re-
serve” to fund the fiscal 2010 budget deficit, and it is likely that 
all the money will be gone in a few years.219 Thereafter, Chica-
goans will have to find other sources of money to fund a gov-
ernment whose size was bloated by parking meter revenues. 
Future ratepayers are likely to find themselves paying more in 
taxes and parking fees while receiving less in the way of gov-
ernment services, compared to those who reside in Chicago in 
the years immediately following the receipt of the parking me-
ter revenues. 
It makes no sense to prevent governments from entering 
into transactions under which they receive cash payouts. That 
said, identifying payouts as a critical component of what makes 
these agreements troubling also suggests another approach 
that might work, an approach that focuses on the hidden bor-
rowing itself. The next section describes this approach. 
2. Limiting Harmful Effects 
There is nothing inherently wrong with governments bor-
rowing money. There also is nothing inherently wrong with 
governments privatizing some of their activities. However, 
when governments merge the two activities into one, whether 
through an abusive sale-leaseback arrangement or a privatiza-
tion deal generating a large up-front cash payment, something 
is clearly lost. That something is transparency, a transparency 
that helps voters evaluate and control the actions of their gov-
erning agents. The method described below will restore some 
transparency to these transactions, and thus some accountabil-
ity for the politicians that engage in them. Such transparency 
should not interfere with justifiable privatization arrange-
 
 218. According to the material put out by the City of Chicago explaining 
the parking meter lease transaction, $325 million would be used to defray 
shortfalls in the 2010–2012 budgets and $400 million would be placed in a 
“long-term reserve.” See Chicago Parking Meter Facts, supra note 123. 
 219. According to the City’s own press releases, the 2010 budget takes 
“$270 million . . . from the parking meter long-term reserve” and “advance[s] 
the $100 million 2012 parking Meter [sic] mid-term reserve.” Press Release, 
Peter Scales, Mayor Daley Presents 2010 Budget Proposal (Oct. 21, 2009), 
available at http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/obm/provdrs/city_budg/ 
news/2009/oct/mayor_daley_presents2010budgetproposal.html. For how this 
corresponds to the original projections, see Fran Spielman, Bye-Bye to Almost 
$1 Billion; 2010’s $6.1 Billion Budget Has Property Tax Relief, No Tax Hikes, 
but It’s Eating up Huge Chunk of Parking Meter Windfall, CHI. SUN-TIMES, 
Dec. 3, 2009, at 14. 
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ments, but may well deter those that would be undertaken only 
as a means of obtaining unregulated financing. 
The underlying scheme is quite simple. State statutes 
should require that governments place in escrow funds suffi-
cient to generate an income stream equal to the net taxes or 
fees alienated, or rental obligations created, under any contrac-
tual relationship in which the government receives large, up-
front cash transfers.220 Importantly, this net amount should be 
determined within the four corners of that contractual relation-
ship. A government should not be able to claim that its use of 
revenues generated from the deal on some other governmental 
expense (say, in the case of the parking meter arrangement, on 
schools) will confer future, offsetting benefits on future genera-
tions of ratepayers. These statutes would then require that the 
escrowed funds, and the income generated through investment 
of the escrowed amounts, be paid to the government over the 
lifetime of the contract on approximately the same schedule as 
the government would have received fees or taxes had the par-
ties never entered into the contract.  
Such a requirement would still leave governments with an 
incentive to enter into profitable privatization deals, as they 
could spend as they please any amounts received in excess of 
accelerated revenue. The governmental officials who imple-
mented the privatization plan could also spend the gains gen-
erated from lowering the cost of performance or increasing rev-
enue. At the same time, they would be dissuaded from entering 
into transactions where the sole benefit stems from accelerat-
ing the receipt of fee or tax revenue because the officials would 
not benefit from the acceleration. The requirement here is to 
compensate future taxpayers for their losses, not to interfere 
with efficient privatization deals. 
The aim of the rule is to keep governments from disguising 
debt as “gains” from a sale or lease contract. This may prevent 
governments from incurring some debt or it may force govern-
ments to get explicit permission from the electorate to obtain 
access to some funds. Such a change may be unpleasant for the 
 
 220. It will be necessary to define “large, up-front cash transfers” some-
what broadly. Although the current transactions involve single up-front pay-
ments, any statutory or constitutional restriction limited to such transactions 
could be easily avoided by breaking the payment into two parts paid in succes-
sive years. The definition of “large, up-front cash transfers” would probably 
require some sort of present-value test (i.e., a comparison of the value of the 
payouts made in the early years of an arrangement to the value of those made 
in later years).  
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officials involved in the transactions and for their constituents, 
but there would be a point to the unpleasantness: it would force 
both officials and their constituents to recognize, and to some 
extent internalize, the costs of their choices. This should lead to 
better decisions about the nature and extent of governmental 
services and tax burdens.  
The new rule would not hold future ratepayers entirely 
harmless from privatization deals, since future ratepayers nec-
essarily lose the opportunity to enter into similar privatization 
deals. One cannot privatize parking meters or tollways or sew-
age systems twice. But in the absence of a theory entitling ei-
ther current or future ratepayers to any windfall profits pro-
vided by such deals (i.e., those engendered by transferring 
ownership to a more efficient private operator),221 it is hard to 
criticize the scheme on this account. Another objection is that 
enabling such deals now forecloses the possibility of better 
deals in the future. But knowledge is always imperfect, and it 
is equally possible that an earlier deal is better than any that 
would become available to a later set of ratepayers. As long as 
any transaction is priced and structured fairly (hardly a given 
in this context),222 one cannot worry too much about how, with 
the benefit of hindsight, a jurisdiction might have constructed 
the transaction differently.  
The more substantial problem is that often it will be far 
from easy for the parties to determine the amount that should 
be set aside for the benefit of future ratepayers. The difficulties 
stem from two different sources. First, setting an appropriate 
discount rate will be a contentious process, especially if the con-
tract term runs for very long periods of time. Very few (if any) 
bonds or other financial instruments currently run for seventy-
five-year terms,223 all but eliminating the financial markets as 
a source of information about appropriate discount rates. The 
second task may be even harder: determining the amount for-
 
 221. On the one hand, one wants to encourage public officials to find such 
efficient operators (if they exist). See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text. 
On the other hand, providing incentives to the first group of officials arbitrarily 
rewards them in part for being earlier in time; later officials might have made 
the same or an even better deal if the earlier privatization deal had not already 
been struck. The earlier deal deprives the later officials of their chance to shine. 
 222. See supra notes 145–54 and accompanying text.  
 223. Some states place limits on the time state or municipal debt may be 
outstanding. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(d) (home-rule units of local gov-
ernments do not have the power to incur debt payable out of property tax re-
ceipts that mature more than “40 years from the time it is incurred”); id. § 7 
(same for nonhome-rule units of local government).  
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gone by future ratepayers requires offsetting future revenue es-
timates against estimates of the future cost savings (if any) 
from entering into the contract. Estimates are always suscepti-
ble to manipulation. Future revenues may be underestimated 
to make a transaction look more attractive. Clever officials may 
try to undercut the intent of the regime by systematically fail-
ing to exploit a revenue source for several years to make the 
case that profits from its later sale should redound to the bene-
fit of earlier, rather than later, groups of ratepayers. To prevent 
this type of abuse, it may be necessary to calculate future reve-
nues based on the fees that the terms of the privatization 
agreement allow investors to charge. This would have the effect 
of denying politicians most of the gains associated with taking 
the unpopular step of raising rates. However, such a bright line 
rule is probably wise given the difficulties of drawing a line be-
tween situations in which politicians would not have been able 
to raise rates in the absence of a privatization deal and those 
situations in which they would have been able to raise rates 
without such a deal. Whether or not undertaken in the context 
of a privatization agreement, politicians can still attempt to 
minimize the political fallout of future rate increases by setting 
fees in the form of a formula, rather than as set amounts. The 
Chicago parking meter lease, for example, allows the Conces-
sionaire to increase parking meter rates in line with increases 
in the consumer price index in the later years of the agree-
ment.224 Federal taxes and benefit payments also are tied to in-
flation indexes.225 Determining the amount of future offsetting 
costs will also be difficult. 
This new rule requires addressing another problem: identi-
fying the transactions subject to the escrow requirement. At the 
very least, a de minimis rule would be necessary since it would 
not make sense to make every sale or sale-like transaction sub-
ject to the regime. The cost of paperwork alone would eliminate 
any possible benefits of, for example, requiring a government to 
escrow some portion of the proceeds generated through the sale 
of obsolete buses, cars, or even most government-owned build-
 
 224. See CHICAGO PARKING METER CONCESSION, supra note 5, at 50,547 
(defining “Regular Rate Adjustment”). 
 225. The statutes setting federal income tax brackets, social security pay-
ments, and legislative salaries all contain automatic inflation adjustments, for 
example. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 31–31(2)(a) (2006) (providing inflation adjust-
ment for congressional salaries); 26 U.S.C. § 1(f ) (2006) (providing inflation 
adjustment for tax-rate tables); 42 U.S.C. § 415 (2006) (providing cost-of-living 
adjustment for social security benefits). 
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ings.226 That said, this rule would require drawing some diffi-
cult lines. Suppose, for example, a government enters into a 
mining lease of some sort. If it receives a cash lump sum rather 
than periodic royalties, should that lump sum be subject to the 
escrow requirement? If the sums involved are significant 
enough, the answer is surely “yes,” though that answer raises 
another question: Over what period of time should the revenues 
be allocated under the escrow? There is no easy answer to this 
question. Given the exhaustible nature of most natural re-
sources, it is unclear whether (as a matter of theory) the re-
ceipts should be spread over the years the mine is in operation, 
or all future years since the current generation has no particu-
lar claim to the resources being exploited. Most likely, rules 
would have to be developed to cover these difficult, but common 
situations. Though such rules undoubtedly would be arbitrary 
at the edges, the alternative would encourage jurisdictions to 
structure natural resource extraction agreements for lump 
sums rather than royalty arrangements.  
The fact that enforcement issues will inevitably afflict the 
regime should not, however, blind one to its merits. Any en-
forceable set aside is better than none, both in terms of inter-
generational fairness and as a check on socially useless privati-
zation deals. And none is what we currently have. 
  CONCLUSION   
Governments, like all large entities, suffer from agency 
problems, and privatization deals often occur amid suspicions, 
if not outright accusations, of favoritism, self-dealing, and sim-
ple incompetence. There are a number of reasons for these sus-
picions, not least being that the market for many of these 
transactions is too thin for many to believe that competition 
adequately polices the price negotiations, while the absence of a 
market check also makes it harder to impose political checks. 
This lack of accountability probably cannot be solved, which 
makes it all the more important that privatization transactions 
be limited to those justifiable on grounds other than that they 
serve as a convenient mechanism for evading legal and political 
restrictions on debt. To put it another way, one of the problems 
with incurring debt through privatization transactions is that it 
 
 226. Alternatively, one might have a rule that a jurisdiction can receive an 
amount equal to its actual cash purchase price for an asset without becoming 
subject to the escrow regime. This would take care of many small-sales trans-
actions.  
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turns a transaction for which there are sufficient market 
checks to minimize opportunities for corruption and incompe-
tence—conventional debt—into one with almost unlimited op-
portunities for both. Further, the price that is exacted is not 
paid entirely in cash. These deals typically restrict future gov-
ernment decisionmaking in ways that could be counterproduc-
tive while minimizing opportunities for public oversight. The 
situation cries out for rules that would operate to minimize the 
occurrence of these transactions, discouraging their use solely 
for political optics. This Article proposes one such rule. 
Even if it is theoretically possible to reduce the number of 
questionable transactions, as a practical matter, reform may be 
unlikely. At the very least, state legislatures would have to 
adopt the legal changes suggested in this Article. Further, they 
might have to be incorporated into state constitutions. Yet, in 
the area of debt financing, state legislators and officials are 
subject to the same perverse incentives as local politicians.227 
They too often prefer to postpone the day of fiscal reckoning, 
and forcing local governments to be honest about their fiscal 
status may increase political pressure on state as well as local 
officials.228 Hard-pressed localities often turn to state entities to 
compensate for funding shortfalls; and state officials risk be-
coming a lightning rod for public discontent when they fail to 
provide such aid. Further, corrective legislation can be overrid-
den by majority vote, so the stability of statutory reforms is 
questionable. But as an initial matter, these political impedi-
ments are secondary to the question of whether it is possible to 
craft a legally effective corrective to debt-avoidance techniques, 
one with more bite than the debt limitation restrictions gov-
ernments adopted after the last municipal debt crisis. This Ar-
ticle suggests one such corrective mechanism. 
 
 227. Indeed, some state governments have resorted to similar devices to 
avoid debt limitations applicable to them. See, e.g., Carbonara, supra note 90 
(describing the sale and leaseback of the Arizona state capitol building and 
comparable transactions in California and Connecticut).  
 228. For example, constitutional limitations on state debt tended to result 
in the “devolution” of the debt burden to local governmental entities rather 
than decrease overall levels of debt. See Kiewiet & Szakaly, supra note 39, at 
85 (concluding that an empirical study shows “strong indications of devolution”). 
